1. The only question argued before us is that of limitation. The decision on that question depends upon the construction to be placed on the term of the bond as to the time when the money became due and payable. The bond runs as follows:
As I have received Rs. 300 (three hundred) in respect of both items in accordance with the said particulars, I shall pay you every month Rs, 3, being the interest on the said amount at 1 per cent, per mensem and (shall pay) the principal Rs. 300 in two years' time and receive back this and the three deeds and the former debt bond. If, in the meantime the hypothecated chits fall to my lot, I shall receive the sums due thereon, and pay them endorsing payments herein below. If there he default in making payments as aforesaid, in subscribing to the said chits, or in paying the interest every month, I shall pay in full the principal with interest at 1 1/2 per cent, on demand by the holder out of my said hypothecated properties. I shall pay the. commission due for taking the first collections.
2. The bond was executed on the 9th February 1882.. If, therefore the interest had been regularly paid, the principal would not have become due until the 9th February 1884, and the suit having been instituted within twelve years from that date, viz., in June 1894, would not have been barred by limitation. It is, however, admitted that no payment at all was made until October 1885, and the lower appellate Court has found that the payment than made was not made on account of interest, but on the general account and that this payment did not, therefore, give rise to a new tempus a quo so as to save the bar by limitation.
3. The lower appellate Court held that the money became due on the first default in payment of interest, viz., in March 1882, and that, as the suit was not brought within twelve years from that date, it was barred.
4. It is admitted that there is nothing to show that any demand for payment was made by the plaintiff before the 9th February 1884, and it is argued by the appellant before us that, in the absence of such demand, the money did not become due until the 9th February 1884, and that the suit was, therefore, improperly dismissed as time-barred.
5. We do not think that this contention can be sustained. It is conceded that, if the bond ran simply I shall pay the principal with interest on demand, no demand would have been necessary to make the money due, and that the time would have run from the date of the bond. (Hempammal v. Hanuman M.H.C.R. 472 Rameshwnr Mandaly Bam Chand Roy I.L.R. 10 C. 1034.
6. The fact that there is a previous covenant, to pay the money within a certain date does not, we think, alter.the meaning or effect of the words in the.later clause making, the money payable on demand. The words 'on demand' must, we think, be regarded as a technical expression equivalent to 'immediately' or 'forthwith.' That, we thinks was the intention of the parties. The defendants having failed to pay interest according to the stipulation in the first part of the bond, the money became payable forthwith, and no actual demand was necessary to complete the plaintiff's cause of action.
7. The appellant's vakil has referred to Hanmantram Sadhuram v. Arthur Bowles I.L.R. 8 B. 56l Ball v. Stowelfe I.L.R. 2 A. 322 but neither of them is on all fours with the present case. In the former, the words were 'if so required,'and the High Court held that there was a deliberate omission by the plaintiff to realize the condition on which the amount should become payable. In other words, it held that the intention of the parties was that the money should not be payable unless and until the plaintiff required the defendant to pay it. In the second case, it was found that the money was to become due only on default in payment of both premia and interest, and there was no proof that there was default in payment of the prsrmia.
8. In the present case, we are of opinion that the plaintiff's right to sue accrued on first defendant's failure to pay the stipulated interest, that is, in March 1882. The lower appellate Court, has found, as a fact, that the payment made by first defendant in October 1885 was not made on account of interest. That is a finding of fact which we cannot question in second appeal. Time, therefore, ran against plaintiff from March 1882, and his suit not having been brought within 12. years from that date was barred by, limitation and was rightly dismissed.
9. We, therefore, confirm the decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss this second appeal with costs.