Subrahmania Aiyar, J.
1. One Seshappaien died in 1859, leaving him surviving a widow the late Thaiyyu Animal, a son and a daughter. The son as the sole surviving male member of the family to which Seshappaien belonged, took the whole of the joint estate. On his death a few years afterwards while remaining unmarried, his mother Thaiyyu Animal inherited the estate. Subsequently, she gave her daughter in marriage and at the time of the marriage made a gift of a portion of the lands, inherited by her, to her son-in-law. The District Munsif find the Subordinate Judge held that the gift was binding upon the appellant who as the heir of the last full owner has since the demise of Thaiyyu Ammal become entitled to succeed to the property. ON behalf of the appellant it was urged that a Hindu qualified owner in the position of Thaiyyu Ammal has no authority to make such a gift and even should it be held that she had, the gift in question in the present instance, ought, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, to be declared unjustifiable. As to the latter part of this contention it may at once be observed that I see no grounds for differing from the lower Court, in their conclusion that the gift cannot with reference to the extent of the whole estate and the other circumstances bearing on the matter be taken to be otherwise than fair and reasonable. The question, therefore, is, had Thaiyyu Ammal authority to make a gift of lauded property inherited by her to her son-in-law at the time of her daughter's marriage? 'No direct ruling on the point was cited before us. Reference was, however, made to certain passages in the Mitakshara and the Smrithi Chandrika wherein the texts of Manu, Yajnavalkya and other Smrithi writers dealing with the question of allotment to be made by brothers to their maiden sisters at the time of partition are commented upon. With reference to the true meaning of these texts commentators are divided. Some of them hold that all that the texts mean is that funds required for the marriage of sisters should be provided out of their father's estate. Other commentators, Vijnanesvara among thomlay down that inclusive of their marriage expenses sisters are entitled to a provision not exceeding a fourth of what they would have got had they been males. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to discuss which of the two kinds is to be taken as law. Assuming that, as argued for the appellant, the view advocated by Vijnanesvara and his followers is not law, the fact that so high an authority as the author of the Mitakshara propounds a rule thus favorable to maiden daughters ought to make one hesitate to accept as sound the exceedingly limited construction which was insisted on behalf of the appellant and which can scarcely be said to be in itself very reasonable, Viz:--That the texts justify a disbursment out of the estate of only the price of things required in connection with the celebration of the marriage. In my opinion, the better and sounder view is as contended for the respondents that the authorities should be understood to empower a qualified owner like Thaiyyu Ammal to do all acts proper and incidental to the marriage of a female according to the general practice of the community to which she belongs. Now it is well known that at the time a girl belonging to the community with which we are concerned in this case is handed over in marriage, certain other gifts have to be made to the bridegroom of which 'bhudanam' a gift of land is one (See Beauchamp's Abbe Dubois on Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies, p. 225). That, according to the notions of the people a gift of that kind on such an occasion is indispensable, is clear from what is done even in cases in which the family of the bride is not really in a position to give any land. In such cases, conformity to the requirements of custom is sought to be secured by giving some little money as and for land. Nor is it difficult to understand how such a practice came to prevail from time immemorial. For the gift being in reality intended as a provision for the married couple, the act was naturally treated as enhancing the merit of the primary act, viz., the gift of a virgin which, from a religious point of view is supposed to be productive of considerable benefit to the parents of the virgin. It seems, therefore, but right to conclude that a gift of land to the bridegroom on the occasion of his marriage is an act warranted by the authorities and is within the power of a qualified owner like Thaiyyu Ammal, provided, of course, the gift is, having regard to the position of the family and all the other circumstances of the case, of such a fraction of the estate as would by reasonable persons be considered fair and proper.
2. As already stated the finding in the present instance is to that effect.
3. I, therefore, concur with the lower Courts in upholding the gift and would dismiss the second appeal with costs.
4. I concur.