1. The award in this case adjudged to the plaintiffs certain immoveable property to recover which the present suit is brought. The date of the award is 7th July 1893, and this suit was instituted on the 15th of November-1897. The District judge held the suit was barred by limitation, as the article-applicable was 113 of the second schedule of the Limitation Act. That article provides for suits for specific performance of a contract and allows only 3 years from the date fixed for the performance and in case no date is fixed when the plaintiffhas notice that performance is refused. We may note in passing that, if the article is applicable, the Judge's decision is defective, as he does not state from which period limitation began to run in this case. We are, however, unable to agree with the Judge that the said article 113 is applicable to the present case. This is a suit for the recovery of land, the title to which was declared in plaintiffs' favor by the award. The award does not provide for the execution of any instruments between the parties, or the performance of any conditions precedent to the plaintiffs' enjoyment of the land--in other words, the plaintiffs acquired under the award a complete title to the land on the date of the award and were entitled to take possession thereof from that dale. In these circumstances, the suit clearly appears to us to be one falling under Article 144 for the possession of immoveable property, and is within the 12 years time allowed by that article. Even if the suit be treated as one to enforce the terms of an award, the only article applicable is No. 120 for suits for which no period of limitation is otherwise provided and the suit is within the 6 years' time allowed by that article1. Our attention has been called to Sukho Bibi v. Ram Sukh Das, where a suit for money under an award was held to be virtually a suit to have the award specifically enforced and was governed by article 113, and the same article was held applicable in a similar suit in Raghubar Dial v. Madan Mohun Lal, although the reasoning in the latter case appears to be nconsistent with that in the former. In the first place, it is difficult to see how a suit for a sum of money can in any light be regarded as a suit for specific performance, In the next place, we think a suit to enforce an award cannot be treated as a suit to enforce a contrat within the meaning of article 113, as the term contract there must be understood in its ordinary sense. It is true that Section 30 of the Specific Relief Act directs that the provisions of chapter II of that Act shall apply to awards. It cannot on that ground be contended that awards are contracts, because it would have to be similarly contended that directions in a will or codicil to execute a particular settlement, which are included in the same section, are also contracts, which would be absurd. No doubt, an award springs out of an agreement to submit to arbitration, but the award itself is a decision of the arbitrator Wading upon the parties as a decision. The observations of the Lord Chancellor reported at I.L.R. (1897) M. 324. Swanston 54 and of Lord Justice Turner, 7 De Gex M & G 317, do not, in our opinion, go so, far as to declare that in England an award is a contract. They merely show that the jurisdiction of the Courts of Equity in enforcing the specific performance of the provisions of an award rests on the ground that the award is the outcome of the contract to refer to arbitration. It appears to be on this Principle that Section 30 of the Specific Relief Act so far as it relates to awards has been enacted. However this may be, the authorities cited afford no warrant for our construing the term 'contract' in article 113 as comprehending an award.
2. We must, therefore, reverse the decree of the District Judge, as the suit is not barred by limitation and remand the appeal for hearing and disposel with reference to the other questions raised in the case. Costs will abide and follow the result.