1. This is a suit by the plaintiffs as reversioners for a declaration that certain alienations are invalid, so far as they are concerned, after the death of their mother.
2. Ananthakrishnaiyar was the last full owner of the property. He died some 45 years ago, leaving a widow Tayamal and two daughters Tailamal and Lachmi. Tayamal gave a house and certain of the lauds to the 3rd defendant and certain other land to the 2nd defendant, these being, respectively, the sons of her daughters Tailamal and Lachmi. This was in 1867. Tayamal died about 1870, and Tailamal died in 1901. Lachmi is still alive. She is the mother of the 2nd defendant and of the plaintiffs.
3. The plaintiffs are the younger brothers of the 2nd defendant, and their suit is for a declaration that the alienations made by Tayamal in 1867 are invalid as against them after the death of their mother Lachmi. Lachmi is the first defendant; her eldest son is the 2nd defendant. Tayamal's son is the 3rd defendant; and the alienees from the latter are the other defendants.
4. The Subordinate Judge held, inter alia, that the plaintiffs' suit was barred by Article 120, Schedule II, of the Limitation Act, and dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appeal, but we think that the suit is clearly barred. The learned Advocate-General, who appeared for the appellants, admitted that the article of the Limitation Act applicable is No. 120, and that under it the suit is barred unless brought within six years from the time when the cause of action accrued. Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4 attained their majority more than six years before the suit was brought, and the Advocate-General did not contend that the suit was not barred so far as they were concerned. He, however, argued that the suit by the 5th plaintiff was not barred as it was brought within three years of Ins attaining majority. His contention was that the right of each reversioner is derived direct from the last full owner and not from any intermediate reversioner, and that the 5th plaintiff's right to sue could not have arisen until after his birth and that he may, therefore, sue at any time within three years of attaining majority. We think this argument is fallacious. The plaintiffs are admittedly members of a joint Hindu family, and they would, be entitled to succeed jointly to the estate of their maternal grandfather Ananthakrishnaiyar if their mother, Lachmi, were now dead Venkayyama Garu v. Venkatramanayyamma Bahadur Garu I.L.R. (1902) M. 678. They would inherit his estate as ancestral property under the ordinary law of inheritance with right of survivorship. The first plaintiff was alive at the date of the alienations, and the right to sue accrued to the family on the date of the alienation Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chirwvolu Perrazu I.L.R. (1906) M.408. The first plaintiff attained majority many years ago and could have brought the present suit on behalf of the joint family. It is clear that in a suit by the plaintiffs to recover a debt due to their Joint family, and which belonged to their joint family, a fresh cause of action, a fresh starting point for limitation, would not arise on the birth of each new member of the family. The interest of such a member would be held to have been represented by the other members of the joint family, and it is impossible to hold that in a suit like the present, where the 5th plaintiff's interest in the subject-matter of the suit is more remote, he should be in a more favourable position as regards representation by other members of the family. His interest was represented by the manager and other members of the family who allowed the right of the family to bring the suit to be barred many years ago. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.