1. It is not disputed that defendants 1 and 3 were partners in a firm with defendant 2 and that they had power to execute promissory notes binding on the firm. But Ex. A was signed only by defendants 1 and 3 in their own names without any words following their signatures to describe in what capacity they signed the note. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar for defendant 2 contends that, as they did not sign the note in the name of the firm or, at any rate, did not add any words to their signatures showing that they signed as partners of the firm or even that they were not signing merely in their personal capacities, defendant 2 cannot be liable on the note. Koneti Naicker v. Gopala Aiyar : (1913)25MLJ425 and Sri Yerruganti Chinna Venkatanarayanan v. Kota Girt Vejtikatanarasimka (1913) M.W.N. 1005, on which he relies, do not go so far as to lay down that, if an executant of a promissory note is to be bound in any other than his personal capacity, that must be shown by his signature and cannot be effectively shown in any other way. Section 27 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that a person may be bound by a duly authorised agent 'acting' in his name, not 'signing ' in his name. In Sadasuk Janki Das v. Sir Kishan Pershad I.L.R. (1918) C. 663 : 1918 M.L.J. 429 their Lordships of the Privy Council lay down that, if a principal is to be bound by an agent's signature to a promissory note, his name 'must be disclosed in such a way that on any fair interpretation of the instrument his name is the real name of the person liable upon the bill.' They do not say that there must be anything in the signature to show that the signatory signs, not for himself in his personal capacity, but for his principal. Indeed, if that were essential, a large part of their Lordships' judgment in that case would be superfluous. In the present case, Ex. A is stated in its first sentence to be executed 'by the company of Adanki Bhujanga Rao and Induru Pattabhirama Reddi', and that, it is admitted, is the style of the firm. Then it proceeds 'on account of the necessity of the company we have this day received', etc. In my opinion on a fair interpretation of that instrument, even though signed by defendants 1 and 3 with their names aloney the name of the firm as the party liable insufficiently disclosed, and defendant 2 as a partner in the firm is therefore liable on the note.
2. In regard to interest, it appears that the firm bought forbearance by Ex. D, and I see no sufficient reason to interfere with the learned Subordinate Judge's decree except to the extent of making the interest at 24 per cent, run only from the date of Ex. D, leaving the interest at 9 per cent, under Ex. A up to that date. The propriety of this modification of the Subordinate Judge's decree is not disputed before me for the plaintiff.
3. The Subordinate Judge's decree will be modified in the manner indicated. In other respects the appeal is dismissed. The parties will pay and receive proportionate costs throughout.