1. Our answer to the questions put to us is in the affirmative. In our opinion Sections 278 to 281 of the Civil Procedure Code are not restricted to properties under attachment which are capable or tangible or physical possession.
2. The term 'possession' is no doubt, one which is used in widely different senses in dealing with different subjects, and refers sometimes to tangible or physical possession and sometimes to constructive possession, or possession in law, In Webster's Dictionary the legal meaning of 'possession' includes ' the having or holding of property in one's power or command' See also Anderson's Dictionary of Law, page 790.
3. In our opinion it would be unreasonable to restrict the meaning of the word ' possessed' in Section 279 and of the word 'possession' in Sections 280 and 281 to merely tangible or physical possession: Such restricted meaning would, we think, unduly narrow the operation of Section 278 which relates to claims preferred to and objections made to the attachment of, 'any property attached.' Section 266 specifies a debt as one species of property which is liable to attachment, and Section 268 prescribes the mode n which a debt is to be attached. Section 301, which vests a debt sold in execution in the purchaser, refers to such transfer of the debt as 'delivery' of the debt. No reason can be suggested for excluding from the beneficent operation of the claim sections of the Code debts and other species of intangible property. We may also refer to Section 355 of the Code in which the word ' possess' is clearly used as applicable not only to tangible property but also to debts and other intangible property.
4. We are therefore of opinion that the words ' possess' and 'possession' in the claim sections of the Code include constructive possession' or possession in law of debts and other intangible property, and that the decision to the contrary effect in Basavayya v. Syed Abbas Saheb I.L.R. 24 M. 20 is erroneous.