1. If the pattah which had been originally tendered before the Summary Suit under Section 9 of the Rent Recovery Act was one that the tenant was bound to accept, the landlord might by virtue of Section 7 sue for the recovery of rent on the strength of such tender alone, without any fresh tender of a pattah, or the execution of a muchilika after judgment.
2. But if the pattah originally tendered was not such as the tenant was bound to accept, and if it had been modified by the judgment in the summary suit, and if before the expiry of the fusli to which the pattah relates, the landlord tendered the pattah as amended, he could also maintain a suit for rent under Section 7, relying on such tender. If, however, no such tender was made (and even in cases where it could not have been made by reason of the expiry of the fusli before the judgment was passed), the landlord could sue for rent only if the tenant had executed a muchilika, which he was directed to execute by the judgment, or if he had refused to execute the same. In the latter case Section 72 provides that certified copy of the judgment of the Collector shall have the same force and effect as a muchilika executed by the tenant himself; but we are clearly of opinion that he cannot be said to have refused to execute the muchilika unless before suing for rent the landlord made a requisition or demand on the tenant calling upon him to execute a muchilika in accordance with the judgment then in force. We dissent from the contrary view taken in Court of Wards v. Darmalinga I.L.R. 8 M. 2. The view we have taken is, we think, in accordance with that taken in the recent Full Bench decision of this Court in Shanmuga Mudaly v. Palnati Kuppu Chetty I.L.R. 25 M. 613 although the proceedings in that case related to the ejectment of the tenant in execution of a decree under Section 10.
3. In C.R.P. 494 there is no allegation of any such demand as is required by law, and there is therefore no ground for revision in that case. It is dismissed with costs.
4. In C.R.P. Nos. 492 and 493 however the plaint distinctly alleges such demand and refusal. We therefore set aside the decrees of the District Munsif in these two cases and remand the suits for disposal according to law. Costs in this Court will be costs in the cause.