1. The defendants Nos. 1 to 4 entered into a contract with the plaintiff to sell him certain lands for Rs. 1,400. He brings the suit to enforce specific performance. The Courts below have dismissed the suit. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 were minors and the contract was entered into on their behalf by the first defendant as their guardian. It is found that the contract was not for purposes binding on the minors and therefore no specific performance could be decreed against their interests in the properties. The contract being one and indivisible the Courts below have dismissed the suit even against defendants Nos. 1 and 4. In second appeal the plaintiff asks for a decree against the shares of the 1st and 4th defendants at least. This, we think, he cannot have. Section 17 of the Specific Relief Act is against him. Sections 14, 15 and 16 of the Act do not enable the contract to be separated as regards the 1st and 4th defendants in this case. The plaintiff relies on the decision in Gurusamy v. Ganapathiah I.L.R. (1882) M. 337. The contract in that case was before the Specific Relief Act. The decree, therefore, which the Court felt itself competent to make at page 344 of the report would appear to be justifiable under the law as it stood before the Act--see Barrow v. Scammall (1887) 19 Ch. D. 175. Such a course does not appear to be warranted by the proviso to Section 15. Collect remarks in his book on the Specific Relief Act: ' Probably the proviso in Section 15 was framed to meet the difficulties which have thus arisen in English cases.' If the contract is indivisible under Section 17 of the Act, what then is the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled We are asked by the appellant to give him a decree for the whole against the 1st and 4th defendants on the authority of Srinivasa Reddi v. Siva Rama Reddi I.L.R. (1908) M. p. 320. This we are unable to do. That was a case in which the contract was entered into with the manager of a Hindu family. It was sought to be enforced against him and another member not a party to the contract. Although it was found that it was not binding on the person who was not a party to the contract, the Court passed a decree against the contracting party for specific performance, leaving the question open as regards the binding character of such conveyance as between the purchaser and the junior member who was no party to the contract. It is unnecessary for us to express an opinion as to the correctness of the observations in the case as regards the true interpretation of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act. It is enough for us to say that the present case is different because the contract is one entered into on behalf of the minors as well, and the suit is, therefore, properly brought for enforcement of the contract against them also. We cannot, therefore, treat the finding that the contract is not binding on defendants Nos. 2 and 3 as uncalled for. The decision in Kosuri Ramaraju v. Jvahiri Ramalingam I.L.R. (1902) M. 74 recognizes this distinction. It follows that no decree can be passed compelling a conveyance of the interest of the 2nd and 3rd defendants as well by the 1st and 4th defendants. The appellant, however, expresses his willingness to take a conveyance by the 1st and 4th defendants of all their interests in the suit properties for the purchase money agreed upon without abatement or compensation.
2. We think he is entitled to this decree. In reversal, therefore, of the decrees of the Courts below, we direct that on payment within three months from this date of the balance of the purchase-money by the plaintiff, the 1st and 4th defendants do execute a conveyance of their interests in the suit properties in favour of the plaintiff. As the plaintiff did not agree to this course in the Courts below we direct him to pay the costs of the respondents.