Krishnaswami Nayudu, J.
1. The plaintiff is the appellant. The suit was for recovery of damages for loss of reputation and expense and mental agony as he was falsely charged of having brought paddy without permit during the period when the control regulations were in force, by the first defendant with the help of the second and third defendants. The first defendant is a village officer, the second defendant is a Sub-Magistrate and third defendant is a Head Constable. The plaintiff was arrested for violation of the control orders on 12th March, 1947, and he got an order for release on bail on 15th March, 1947, from the Sub-Collector, Musiri, but he was actually released only on 17th March, 1947. His case was that he had a permit for bringing this paddy from Alagarai to Manamedu where the 7 bags were seized. The permit was however not produced. Both the Courts have found that there was no such permit and the seizure and arrest could not, therefore, be considered to be illegal or unlawful. With that finding I find no grounds to interfere.
2. The learned Counsel however relied on Rule 5 of the Madras Food Grains Procurement Order, 1944, which provides that an exception may be made in the case of transport of food grains without written permit if the food grains are transported to the usual place of storage situate in an adjoining village. That was not the case set up by the plaintiff and as there was no evidence to show that his only place of storage was in Manamedu, he could not avail himself of the exception under Rule 5. This appeal fails and is dismissed. But there is one aspect of the case which requires to be considered. The order of release on bail was passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate at 12 noon on 15th March, 1947, and in the order it is stated that the Sub-Magistrate should release the plaintiff on bail 'after obtaining the signature of the accused on the bail bond.' It is the plaintiff's case that sureties were produced before the Sub-Magistrate and the surety bond was also executed. But the fact remains that he was not released until the 17th. The second defendant who was the Sub-Magistrate says that nobody approached him on the 15th and that he knew of the order only on 16th March, 1947, when he opened the tappal and that as the 16th was a Sunday, he released him on the 17th. The second defendant stated that in view of the instructions in Exhibit B-16 which directed that no prisoner should be released on a Sunday or jail holiday on bail, he did not take any steps on Sunday but he released him on the 17th. Exhibit B-16 is a copy of the instructions issued by the Inspector-General of Prisons dated 10th March 1941, (R. Dis. 2222 of 1940). The instructions were issued to all District Magistrates, a copy of which has been forwarded to all Sub Magistrates and Sub-Divisional Magistrates and to Sub-Jail Superintendents. I am surprised that this order of the Inspector-General of Prisons should be allowed to continue to be in force and should be taken notice of by the Magistrates in directing release of prisoners, under trial or otherwise, who are granted bail by Courts. When a bail order releasing a prisoner is passed, the order must be given immediate effect. In this case as the plaintiff had furnished the required sureties or was prepared to sign the bail bond there was no reason for detaining him longer than absolutely necessary and the detention on Sunday and his release on Monday is quite against the order of Court granting bail. Such departmental instructions which in effect nullify the orders of Court granting bail especially where the freedom of the citizen is concerned, should not be allowed to be continued in force and any administrative order which would prevent an order of Court to release on bail or otherwise could not have any value and such orders should not be countenanced. It is surprising that this order passed in 1941, should be allowed to be in force. There cannot be any order passed by any administrative authority preventing the execution of an order of release passed by a competent Court and this order of the Inspector-General of Prisons is one which in the circumstances could not be allowed to stand. The sooner this order is rescinded the better. A copy of this judgment will be sent to the Government (Home Department) and to the Inspector-General of Prisons for necessary action.
3. With the observation that it is unfortunate that the plaintiff whose initial arrest could not be said to be illegal was unduly detained for a larger period than he deserved, this second appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances each party will bear their respective costs. No leave.