Krishnan Pandalai, J.
1. This appeal arises from a suit brought by a land-holder under Section 151 of the Madras Estates Land Act. The defendant is a ryot who is in possession under a patta of ten cents of dry land adjacent to his house. The plaint allegations were that on the 26th August, 1923, the defendant began to remove earth by digging pits in these ten cents of land, that by doing so the value of the holding was materially impaired and the land substantially rendered unfit for agricultural purposes. The plaintiff claimed that on those allegations he was entitled under Section 151 of the Act to eject the defendant from his holding, or in the alternative to compensation or an injunction. The plaintiff sued for all the three reliefs assessing his damages at Rs. 500. The defendant pleaded that he did not dig pits on the 26th August, 1923, as alleged by the plaintiff, or render the holding unlit for cultivation for agricultural purposes by doing so. But he alleged that these ten cents of land had never been cultivated for 20 years, having been always unfit for cultivation, that it was in fact a manure pit used for storing manure, which itself was a very useful purpose in connection with agriculture. As to damages, the defendant said that it would cost not more than Rs. 20 (twenty) to fill up the pit. There were some other allegations relating to the tenure of the land which are now not material. The Sub-Collector who heard the case framed as many as eight issues of which only one and two are material. The first was whether the defendant has dug pits in item 2 of plaint scheduled lands and rendered the said holding unfit for agricultural purposes and the second whether the plaintiff's suit is barred by time. The Sub-Collector took evidence on all the issues but decided only the above two. Not only on the evidence recorded before him but after a personal inspection of the property, he found that the plot in question was a narrow strip of land about 10 yards wide behind the house of the plaintiff. He also found manure stored to a depth of about 1 foot over one-fourth of the area of the land. The so-called pit was itself about a foot deep in the middle of which there were three babul trees which we found were three or four years old. On these facts the Sub-Collector found that the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant had dug the pit on the 26th August, 1923 and thereby rendered the plot unfit for cultivation was untrue, that the land must have remained in the condition in which he saw it for several years prior to the date mentioned and that therefore the suit was barred by limitation under ArticleS 17 and 18 in the Schudle A to the Estates Land Act. This opinion was upheld on appeal by the District Judge.
2. It is argued in second appeal that the Courts should have gone into the other issues and recorded findings on them, that the suit was not barred under the provisions mentioned, because the land was rendered unfit, not when the pits were dug as mentioned in the plaint, but on the subsequent date and lastly, that the suit was governed, so far, at any rate, as the prayer for injunction was concerned, not by ArticleS 17 and 18 of Schudle A to the Estates Land Act, but by the provisions of the general Limitation Act. As to the first contention, in the nature of the findings arrived at by the Sub-Collector, it was unnecessary to go into the other issues. The suit had been brought upon definite allegations under a specific provision of the statute and the question of limitation was raised upon those pleadings. When it was found that the suit as brought was barred by limitation, it would have been an unnecessary waste of time to consider other matters. The second point was the most pressed; but in my opinion, it has no foundation whatever. It was argued that the cause of action arose on some date other than the alleged date of the digging of the pits. What other date was meant was not stated, except that it was left to be inferred that the date the damage was done was some other date than the date of digging the pits. There is absolutely no foundation in the pleadings for any such inference. The only damage that was alleged was that pits were dug. No other damage was intended or suggested. The issues made this perfectly clear and certainly it is not open to the appellant now to allege that he intended some other damage, which began at some other time not mentioned in the pleadings and not mentioned even in the arguments in appeal. I am of opinion that the only point that had to be actually decided was whether the land was rendered unfit for cultivation by the defendant having dug pits therein, on the 26th August, 1923 or at some period before that date, which was less than two years prior to the date of the suit. This having been found against the plaintiff, the suit was rightly held to be barred.
3. The last contention is that the suit should have been held to be governed by the general Limitation Act. Mr. Satya-narayana for the appellant said that this result was to be obtained by reading Sections 210 and 211 of the Estates Land Act together. It is not possible for me to see how this result could be obtained. Section 211(2) expressly says: 'Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act shall apply.' But Section 210 is within that chapter and that section expressly says that every suit instituted, appeal presented and application made after the period of limitation mentioned in the schedule shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. From that it follows that the provisions of the Limitation Act made applicable by Section 211(2) are subject to the operation of Section 210 and the periods limited by the schedule. I reject this contention also.
4. The second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.