1. This appeal arises out of proceedings instituted under Sections 15 and 19 of Act IV of 1938, a reference to Order 21, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, being also added in the application. The applicants in the trial Court were persons liable to make periodical payments known as panaya purappad and the present appellant was an assignee of the right to collect those payments. We have no doubt held that these periodical payments of panaya purappad are not rent for the purpose of Section 15 of Act IV of 1938, and also that an assignee of the right to collect arrears of rent is not a jenmi or intermediary for the purpose of the same section. The trial Court, however, treated this payment as one of rent and treated the respondent as a person standing in the position of a jenmi or intermediary and recorded satisfaction of the decree for arrears of this periodical payment, except for the amount of costs, on the deposit of the arrears for the two years contemplated in Section 15. The decree-holder, mistaking his remedy, filed an appeal before the District Judge and no objection was taken as to the maintainability of the appeal. The appeal was dismissed and a second appeal has been filed here.
2. The question is whether the second appeal lies. No appeal is, of course, provided in the Act. We have repeatedly held that when a decree has been amended under Section 19 of the Act, an appeal lies under the ordinary law. against the amended decree, though no appeal lies against an order recording full satisfaction of the decree under that section. There is no procedure prescribed in the Act for dealing with decrees for rent, though clearly under Section 15 of the Act rent can be discharged by the procedure in that section even though it has been decreed and Section 16, expressly safeguards any amount decreed as costs. In a case Ramadoss Reddiar v. Muniswami Reddiar : AIR1941Mad116 , this Bench observed that a procedure similar to that laid down for debts by Section 19 could be invoked under Section 15 for the discharge of a decree for rent and this observation has been followed in a number of cases where the Court was actually concerned with the discharge of a decree for rent. An instance is Venkata Rajagopala Krishna Yachendra Bahadur v. Venkata Seshacharlu : AIR1942Mad78 .
3. It has been argued before us that, when under Section 19 a decree for a debt is amended and the resultant amended decree for a lesser amount is not satisfactory to either party, an appeal lies against the amended decree; therefore it is contended when under the analogous procedure for dealing with rents, the amount due under the decree is partly satisfied by the statutory deposit and satisfaction of the old arrears and there remains a decree for costs, the effect of this process is, in fact to alter the original decree by the cancellation of part of its provisions and to substitute for it a decree for costs only, recording satisfaction of the balance. This process, it is argued is nothing more than the passing of an amended decree which would give rise to a right of appeal. We find ourselves unable to accept this contention.
4. Under Section 19 that which is contemplated is a complete recalculation of the amount to be decreed with reference to the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 and the result normally is a decree which has a totally different basis from the original decree, If the amount already paid towards the debt is sufficient to wipe off the debt as scaled down, then an order of satisfaction is recorded and against this there is no appeal. If however the debt, as scaled down, is not discharged, the section contemplates the drafting of a fresh decree capable of execution and this fresh decree naturally gives rise to a right of appeal just as the original decree was appealable. The process contemplated under Section 15 is different. There is no question of recalculating the amount due under the decree for rent. The basis upon which the decree was passed remains unaltered. All that was to be done is to examine the amount of the deposit, see whether it is sufficient to satisfy the whole of the rent as decreed for fasli 1347 and to what extent it is sufficient to satisfy the rent as decreed for fasli 1346. Then satisfaction has to be recorded of the older arrears under the decree proportionately to the extent to which the arrears for these two faslis have been satisfied. Costs are statutorily safeguarded and the whole process is not one of amendment hut one of satisfaction. It cannot, having regard to previous decisions, be regarded as a process of satisfaction in execution. It. is a statutory satisfaction under the special provisions of the Special Act. No appeal is provided by that Act and we are not prepared to hold merely because the Act safeguards the decree for costs, that this residuum of the decree can be regarded as an amended decree giving rise to a right of appeal.
5. The appeal is therefore dismissed with costs.