Walter Salis Schwabe, K.C., C.J.
1. This is an appeal from an order of the Judge sitting on the Original Side transferring a suit from the District Court of Chingleput to the High Court under Clause 13 of the Letters Patent. As a preliminary point it is argued that no such appeal lies on the ground that the order is not a judgment within the meaning of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. In the recent case of Kanayalal Bhoya v. Paramasuk Doss (1922) 16 L.W. 608, I stated that 'I do not propose to attempt to add a further definition to those which have already been given in other cases.* Definition after definition has been attempted of that word. A very narrow meaning was given to it by Sir Richard Couch in Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. 8 Beng. L.R. 435. A much wider definition was given by a Full Bench of this Court in Tuljaram Rao v. Alagappa Chettiar I.L.R. (1910) M. 1 : 21 M.L.J. 1 , and it is enough for me to say that, in these matters, this Court is bound, by the opinion of its own Full Bench in that case. An attempt was made to give rules in that case which should be exhaustive of any matters that can come before this Court, and, in my judgment, all we have to do now is to say whether the matter in question before us is excluded from or included in the class of judgments referred to there. I find that it was there held that the case of De Souza v. Coles 3 M.H.C.R. 384 in which it was held that the granting or refusing of leave to sue in this Court under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent was a judgment in respect of which an appeal lay under Clause 15 was rightly decided. This has also been held in Vaghoji v. Comaji I.L.R. 29 Bom. 249. I can see no difference in principle between such an order and the order in this case. The learned Judge in this case by his order puts an end to the case as it now stands in Chingleput and confers a jurisdiction on this Court in respect of that particular case. In my judgment, we are bound by the decision of the Full Bench of this Court referred to above and we hold that this is a matter which is appealable. The contrary view has been taken in Khatizan v. Sonairam Daulatram I.L.R. (1920) C. 1104 where, on this precise point, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court has held that no appeal lies, but that Bench has applied the reasoning of Sir Richard Couch in his judgment in Justices of the Peace for Calcutta v. The Oriental Gas Co. (1872) 8 B. L.R. 435 and the passage which they followed in that case is the passage which was expressly dissented from by the Full Bench of this Court in Tuljaram Rao v. Alagappa Chettiar 21 M.L.J. 1 . The Calcutta High Court followed the earlier Calcutta decisions on this point but this Court must follow its own Full Bench decision. It may be that some day this point may somehow get to the Privy Council and then perhaps we shall know whether Madras or Calcutta is right. But, for the present, all we can do is to hold that this appeal lies. The preliminary point therefore fails.
2. Both parties state that, by consent, this appeal has been settled on the terms that it should be dismissed without costs, the respondent undertaking to pay Rs. 100 to the appellants in respect of costs already incurred and also undertaking, if further Court fee has to be paid by reason of the case having been transferred from Chingleput to Madras, to provide what may be necessary up to Rs. 100. C.M.P. No. 681 of 1923 for stay will also be dismissed.
3. I agree.
*In my Judgment in 16 L.W. 608 the sentence 'and the guiding principal is that a decision is a Judgment which is given in an action' should run 'and the guiding principle is that a judgment is a decision which is given in an action.' It is my own fault and not the fault of the reporter.