1. The question which arises for determination in this appeal is whether respondent's adoption can be upheld. Both the courts below have found that the adoption is proved and that Mangamma had her husband's permission to make the adoption. These findings of fact we must accept in second appeal. As regards appellant's contention that Mangamma was under pollution when she adopted respondent, the Subordinate Judge has found that when the pollution was over the Dattahomam was performed and the defect was cured. As to this it is urged by appellant's pleader that unless the gift and acceptance and the Dattahoman take place at the same time, there can be no valid adoption. To this contention, however, we are unable to accede. The learned pleader overlooks the fact that during the ceremony, a formal gift and acceptance are repeated and they are then consecrated by sacrifice by fire or Homam. If therefore the first gift was invalid as a religious act, because there was pollution, the second was perfectly valid. Pollution is only a bar to a religious act and renders religious ceremonies inefficacious but a gift and acceptance are secular acts and they may therefore be supplemented by Dattahoman after the expiration of the period of pollution. It was held in the case of Venkata v. Subhadra I. L. R. (1882) M. 548 that a Dottahomam performed subsequent to the gift and acceptance validates the adoption.
2. It is then said that the plaintiff's natural father was absent when the Dattahomam was performed and that his absence invalidated the ceremony. It must here be observed that it was Mangamma who received respondent in adoption and it was some male proxy on her behalf that should perform the ceremony according to Hindu usage. Such being the case, the absence of plaintiff's natural father is immaterial. Respondent's mother was present on the occasion and made the gift with her husband's consent and a gift so made by a wife is as valid as if her husband was present.
3. The next contention urged on appellant's behalf is that Mangamma's father and respondent's natural father being of the same gotra, no legal marriage was possible between the former in her maiden state and the latter, and consequently, the adoption was invalid. The courts below have overruled this objection on the ground that marriage is forbidden only among Sapindas, but not among Sagotras. This view is no doubt at variance with the Hindu law as explained by this court in Minakshi v. Ramanada I. L. R. (1815) M. 49 But the parties in this case are Saraswat Brahmins and oneinstance is mentioned by the Subordinate Judge of a marriage between persons of the same gotram. If it was necessary to determine this question for the purpose of this appeal we should remit for trial an issue, viz., whether among Saraswat Brahmins in South Canara, marriage is permitted by usage bet ween persons of the same gotram. But having regard to the special circumstances of this case, it appears to us that the adoption should prevail by reason of the doctrine of estoppel. These circumstances are set forth in paragraphs 9 to 16 of the orginal judgment and in paragraph 7 of the appeal judgment. In Parvatibayamma v. Raviakrishna Row I. L. R. (1895) M. 145 this Court discussed the limitations subject to which the doctrine of estoppel is to be applied in the case of invalid adoptions. In the case before us, the adoption took place in 18(3? about a quarter of a century ago and respondent has ever since been recognized as adopted son. He was aged 4 or 5 years when he was adopted and he is now 29 years old. His Upanayanam and marriage were performed in the adoptive family and he is no longer in a position to resume his rights in his natural family. Daring this long period, respondent performed the Sraddhas and other ceremonies in the adoptive family and a cousin of his adoptive father presided on the occasion of his Upanayanam. Thus, the course of conduct of Mangamma and Ors. in the adoptive family was such as to inspire the belief that the communion which a valid adoption creates and is intended to create, existed. Again, the adoption was made in April 1867 and in the same year Mangamma applied for an heir ship certificate on behalf of her minor adopted son. Though appellant and his brothers were then aware of the adoption, they did not then oppose it. It was in 1879, they instituted Original Suit No. 402 of 1879 on the ground that respondent's father and they were undivided, but this suit failed as the appellate courts found that the properties in dispute were the self-acquired properties of Pandit Venkataramanaiya. In 1883 appellant's brother brought Original Suit No. 269 of 1883 to set aside the adoption and it was finally dismissed as barred. Though this suit was brought by one brother only, yet it appears that appellant actively cooperated with him in conducting that suit and did not join it in order that he might institute separate legal proceedings, if that suit failed. After that suit was dismissed, it appears that the appellant gained over some of the tenants and procured attornments from them in collusion. Under these circumstances we think that the doctrine of estoppel will apply and that appellant must be held not to be at liberty to impugn the adoption at this distance of time.
4. We dismiss this second appeal with costs.