1. It is contended on behalf of appellant (i) that, as Exhibit I contains no description of the property sufficient to identify the same, as required by Section 21, Clause (a) of the Registration Act, it could not be registered, and consequently its registration was ultra vires and inoperative for the purposes of Section 48 of the Act; and (ii) that even if the registration be held to be valid, as it was entered only in book No. 4 and not in book No. 1 prescribed by Section 51 of the Act, it is not such as to affect immoveable property.
2. As observed by Pigot, J., in Baij Nath Tewari v. Sheo Sahoy Bhagul I.L.R. 18 Cal. 556 the object of the Registration Act is to provide not only a guarantee of the genuineness of instruments, but also a record from which persons who may desire to enter into dealings with respect to property may be able to obtain information as to title--or to quote the words of the Privy Council in Mohammed Ewaz v. Birj Loll L.R. 4 IndAp 166 'Registration is mainly required for the purpose of giving notoriety to the deed;' and such being the case, it is difficult to see how this object is attained, if a document relating to immoveable property is registered in a book expressly prescribed for documents which do not relate to immoveable property.' Section 60 of the Act requires that the document registered shall have endorsed on it a certificate of the fact of registration 'together with the number and page of the book in which the document has been copied,' and this is the certificate which is 'admissible for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered in manner provided by the Act.'
3. As the original with the endorsement made thereon is returned to the party entitled to the same, he has the means of knowing what has been done by the Registrar; and if he allows to continue a mistake which he thus has the means of causing to be rectified, he has but himself to blame if he becomes a loser thereby ; and his transferrees of course stand in his shoes.
4. In the present case the document I was executed by third defendant in favour of the fourth defendant. First and second defendants are purchasers from fourth defendant, while plaintiff is a purchaser from third defendant. First and second defendants, on seeing their vendor's title-deed, if they had exercised ordinary care and caution, must have seen the flaw in her title, whereas no amount of search in the book No. I in the Registration office would enable the plaintiff to discover that the property sold to him by third defendant did not in fact belong to third defendant as gnati of the last owner Gopal Rao, but to fourth defendant who is the step-mother of the last owner. Cf. Najibulla Mulla v. Nusir Mistri I.L.R. 7 Cal. 196
5. There is authority also for the other objection taken on behalf of appellants in Baij Nath Tewari v. Sheo Sahoy Bhagut I.L.R. 18 Cal. 556 where it was held by the majority of a Full Bench that the absence of a description sufficient to identify the property renders the registration of a document invalid, and where the dissenting Judge, Petheram, C.J., differed from his colleagues only because he was of opinion that the description was in fact sufficient to identify the property.
6. I am inclined, however, to agree with the opinion of Straight, J., as expressed in Hardei v. Ram Lal I.L.R. 11 All. 319 that the word, 'registered' in Section 49 of the Registration Act has reference only to the act of registration by the registration officer; and that, if such officer has put upon the document the certificate required by Section 60, it becomes admissible in evidence. The mere fact of registration is not, however, sufficient to cure defects arising from non-observance of the requirements of Section 21, so as to affect property not specifically described and which has passed into the hands of third parties, though, as against the executant of the document, it might be enforceable on the principle certum est quad oertum reddi potest. Cf. Bamsidh Pande v. Balgobind I.L.R. 9 All. 158 As in the present case the property has passed to a third party for consideration and not only is the description not as clear as is required by Section 21, but the registration itself purports to be of property other than immoveable, I think plaintiff is entitled to a decree.
7. I would allow this appeal and, setting aside the decree of the lower Appellate Court, restore so much of the decree of the District Munsif as awards to plaintiff possession of the land. Plaintiff is also entitled to mesne profits from date of suit to date of getting possession of the property--the' same to be ascertained in execution of the decree--and to his costs throughout to be paid by first, second and fourth defendants.
Subramanta Ayyar, J.
8. I concur.