It is contended that, as the plaintiffs' father purchased the land at a sale for arrears of revenue, Section 38 of Act II of 1864 (Bevenue Recoyery Act) precludes the defendants from proving that the purchase was roally made by the plaintiffs' father, not solely on his own behalf, but on behalf of the villagers generally. The words of Section 38 are ' such sale certificate shall state the property sold and the name of the purchaser, and it shall be conclusive evidence of the fact of the: purchase in all courts and tribunals, where it may bo necessary to prove the same, and no proof of the Collector's seal or signature shall be necessary, unless the authority before whom it is produced shall have reasonto doubt its genuineness.'
The intention clearly was to prevent any plea from being raised that the defaulters interest did not pass by the sale. There is nothing in the language of the section to warrant the contention that' the Legislature intended thereby to preclude proof being giventhat the' person, whose name was entered in the certificate, was not the person, or the only person, who acquired a right under the purchase. Where this was intended, the Legislature has made a distinct provision to that effect as in Section 317, Civil Procedure Code.
The evidence objected.to was, therefore, rightly admitted, and. upon the findings the suit was rightly dismissed
We dismiss the second appeal with costs.