1. This appeal is preferred from the judgment of Ramachandra Iyer J. : (as he then was) in C. M. P. No. 3788 of 1960 in A. S. No. 144 of 1960 pending in this court, It is sufficient for us to observe that the proceeding before the learned Judge was by the appellant bank, for an interim order of stay pending the appeal, with regard to the decree obtained by the respondent (widow of the deceased employee of the bank) embodying the liability of the bank to pay certain provident fund amounts to the credit of that employee. Briefly stated, the bank claimed that the deceased employee was guilty of malversation of the funds of the institution to a far greater extent than the claim and that, therefore, the widow could not obtain such a decree, or at least that she should not be permitted to enforce the desree and take away the monies pending the appeal by the bank against the decree in the widow's suit.
2. The learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer J.:) briefly referred to the circumstances and observed that the grant of an order of stay, upon the facts of the case
'will be tantamount to granting practically an attachment before judgment of the moneys due to the respondent under the decree or to set off an anticipated cross decree'.
For this reason, the petition was dismissed.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant bank contends before us that the principle of Order 21 Rule 29 of the Civil Procedure Code may apply to the present facts, though ha concedes that that rule is not in terms applicable. We do not see how the rule, or the principle of that rule, can apply to the present situation, it is perfectly true that the bank instituted what would be in the nature of a cross-claim against the estate of the deceased employee, for the alleged malversation, but that suit has been admittedly dismissed, and the further proceedings do not now concern us. When the matter came up as an interim proceeding pending the Letters Patent Appeal before the learned Chief Justice (Ramachandra Iyer C. J.) and Jagadisan J. the Bench passed an order to the effect that there would be an interim stay of the present decree on condition that the bank should deposit moneys or furnish security for the decretal amount to the satisfaction of the learned Subordinate Judge of Tanjore, and make regular payments of interest to the respondent. We consider that, upon the face of the present situation, this would be an eminently reasonable and equitable order which should be made absolute pending disposal of the first appeal by the bank. Though the principle of Order 21, Rule 29 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply here, the fact remains that the widow of the deceased employee has obtained a decree for substantial moneys, which decree is under appeal, and it is at least not very clear that she could be permitted with safety to take away these moneys, pending the result of the appeal. We put it to the learned counsel for the respondent whether he could furnish adequate security if the decree is to be enforced as it stands. We are not quite satisfied that the widow of the deceased employee would really be in a position to do this. Hence, we feel that the interim order in C. M. P. No. 8163 and 8715 of 1960 made by the Bench would be the most convenient and equitable arrangement and one which will conserve the interests of both parties. We dispose of this Letters Patent Appeal, by making an absolute order in those terms pending the appeal.
4. It is alleged by the learned counsel for the respondent that, even with regard to that order, there arearrears of interest. These arrears of interest must bepromptly paid by the appellant bank within one monthfrom this date, on intimation by the respondent of theamount due, failing which the decree will become executable forthwith. With regard to the Government promissory notes, now in deposit, we direct that the bank shouldtake steps to have them transferred in the name of thecourt. The parties will bear their own costs.