1. This is an appeal against an order of Beasley, J., as he then was, under Section 476, Criminal Procedure Code, making a complaint under Section 195(i)(b) of the same Code against one M. Namberumal Chetty in respect of an offence punishable under Section 193 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant is not represented before us. We have perused his memorandum of appeal and the order of the learned Judge and we have heard the learned advocate for the respondent, who has raised the preliminary point that no appeal will lie in the circumstances of this case.
2. The complaint was filed not at the instance of any applicant but suo motu by the learned Judge, and the learned advocate's argument is that in such circumstances the terms of Section 476-B do not provide for an appeal. As an authority for this position he refers us to Mt. Satto v. Emperor (1928) 30 Cri. L.J. 163 which is a decision by a single Judge of the Lahore High Court based upon what he terms the genesis of the present section. He appears to read the words in that section 'such a complaint' as meaning not merely a complaint under Section 476 or 476-A but, further, a complaint on an application by some person; but we are of opinion that any analogy which is to be drawn between the terms of the present sections and those of the corresponding sections of the old Code is likely to be misleading inasmuch as the procedure has been radically altered and whereas, under the old Code, a Court could give sanction to prosecute and that sanction to prosecute or; application could be made the subject of an appeal, all that has now been swept away and it is for the Court itself in all cases, whether of its own accord or on application, to make a complaint. We cannot see accordingly why the appealability of an order should depend upon the special circumstances of an application having been made; nor do we think that the terms of the section itself support that view.
3. Coming to the merits, the learned Judge has delivered a very detailed and comprehensive order containing all the materials from which the offence in his view may he established ; and the only criticism that we can discover in the grounds of appeal is that under the terms of Section 476 there should be not only a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made but also a complaint. In the present case it appears that the proceedings are embodied in a single document. But we think that; that document itself serves the, dual purpose of a finding and also of a complaint, because a mere perusal of it will show that the learned Judge has set forth the particulars in respect of which he considers that false evidence was given and the nature of the proofs that that evidence is in fact false and, since these particulars serve the double purpose of a finding and a complaint, we see no reason why they should not be held sufficiently to comply with the requirements of the section, although in that form.
4. We have been referred to one case, Bhuban Chandra Pradhan v. Emperor I.L.R. (1927) C. 279 where the objection was raised that the learned Judge who made the complaint had not recorded a finding that it was expedient in the interests of justice to complain, and this was disposed of with the observation that
the order showed clearly the learned Judge's opinion that the appellant had given false evidence before him. That order by itself, and in view of the proceedings started kinder Section 476 of the Criminal Procedure Code carries the implication that the learned Judge must have felt that the ends of justice required that an inquiry before a Magistrate should take place.'
5. We think that the same implication is clearly to be gathered from the order which the learned Judge has passed in this case; and we can find no grounds for interfering with it in appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.