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D. Ramachandra Ayyar Vs. K. Sesha Aiyangar - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1943Mad523; (1943)1MLJ414
AppellantD. Ramachandra Ayyar
RespondentK. Sesha Aiyangar
Cases Referred and Bindeshri v. Banshilal
Excerpt:
- - 2. the word 'artisan 'has a well-recognised meaning and is roughly synonymous with 'handicraftsman' or 'mechanic......term ' artisan,' although they undoubtedly do not exhaust the class of artisans. the use of the word 'tool ' in section 60 (1) (b) is also an indication that the word ' artisan ' is used in its ordinary sense as a man who uses tools. if we give an extended meaning to ' artisan ' to include persons not ordinarily regarded as artisans, then it becomes necessary to give an extended meaning to ' tools ' also and to regard as tools things which are not commonly understood as such. cooking vessels are certainly not tools in the ordinary sense of the word.3. in manickam v. manikyamma : air1942mad4 , happell, j., has discussed this question fully in considering whether musical instruments used by a professional musician can be regarded as the tools of an artisan; and i completely agree with.....
Judgment:

Horwill, J.

1. The respondent is a hotel-keeper and the question is whether the vessels with which he prepares sweetmeats are tools of an artisan within the meaning of Section 60 (1) (b) of the Civil Procedure Code which are exempt from attachment. The lower Court held they were.

2. The word '' artisan '' has a well-recognised meaning and is roughly synonymous with 'handicraftsman' or 'mechanic.' The three artisans mentioned in the Hereditary Village Offices Act, namely, blacksmith, carpenter and potter, are examples of what is ordinarily understood by the term ' artisan,' although they undoubtedly do not exhaust the class of artisans. The use of the word 'tool ' in Section 60 (1) (b) is also an indication that the word ' artisan ' is used in its ordinary sense as a man who uses tools. If we give an extended meaning to ' artisan ' to include persons not ordinarily regarded as artisans, then it becomes necessary to give an extended meaning to ' tools ' also and to regard as tools things which are not commonly understood as such. Cooking vessels are certainly not tools in the ordinary sense of the word.

3. In Manickam v. Manikyamma : AIR1942Mad4 , Happell, J., has discussed this question fully in considering whether musical instruments used by a professional musician can be regarded as the tools of an artisan; and I completely agree with all that the learned Judge has said on this point. If we apply the reasoning of Happell, J., to the case under consideration it would follow that cooking utensils used by a sweetmeat seller are not tools of artisans. With respect, I find myself unable to agree with the conclusions drawn in Mahabir v. Raghunandham : AIR1935All848 and Bindeshri v. Banshilal (1931) I.L.R. 54 All. 399.

4. Moreover, even a tool used by an artisan is not always the subject of exemption, under Section 60 (1) (b) of the Code unless the artisan is the judgment-debtor himself. If a person employs a number of artisans to work for him and gives them tools for that purpose, he is not himself an artisan but an employer of labour who Would not be entitled to the benefit of the section. So that even if a person who prepared sweetmeats were an artisan, one who employs others to do so would not) be an artisan. A hotel-keeper cannot claim exemption from attachment of the vessels used by his employees in the preparation of food which he sells to the public.

5. The petition is allowed with costs and the execution petition filed by the petitioner in the lower Court ordered to proceed.


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