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Maridu Bramhanna Vs. Sonti Ramaswamy Having Died Pendente Lite His Minor Sons, Sonti Ramakrishna and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported in(1895)5MLJ89
AppellantMaridu Bramhanna
RespondentSonti Ramaswamy Having Died Pendente Lite His Minor Sons, Sonti Ramakrishna and ors.
Cases ReferredDaya v. Param Sulth I. L. R.
Excerpt:
- - suppose the wife brought an action against defendant, would it be a good defence to say that, though she was the person slandered it was intended only to insult her husband. best, j. 2. though most unwilling to disturb the decrees, of the courts below in this case, i am constrained to come to the conclusion that the authorities cited leave us no option and that the plaintiff's suit must fail......the slander. no other person is permitted to sue because however closely he may be related to the person slandered and whatever pain of mind he may suffer from the slander of his relation the injuiy caused to him is mediate or remote and not immediate or proximate. if the rule were otherwise, the defamer might be liable for as many actions as there are near relations of the person defamed. it is said that the detainer's object was to villify the plaintiffs. but the slanderous words spoken do not impute any personal misconduct to him. they do not state the plaintiff knew of his wife's want of chastity and with that knowledge lived with her. the language used is consistent with plaintiffs' belief in his wife's chastity. the object was no doubt to cause intense pain of mind to the.....
Judgment:

Muthuswami Aiyar, J.

1. I do not think that this is a case in which we should depart from the rule that it is the person who is slandered that ought to sue. The plaintiff's wife is sui juris and she may sue for the slander. No other person is permitted to sue because however closely he may be related to the person slandered and whatever pain of mind he may suffer from the slander of his relation the injuiy caused to him is mediate or remote and not immediate or proximate. If the rule were otherwise, the defamer might be liable for as many actions as there are near relations of the person defamed. It is said that the detainer's object was to villify the plaintiffs. But the slanderous words spoken do not impute any personal misconduct to him. They do not state the plaintiff knew of his wife's want of chastity and with that knowledge lived with her. The language used is consistent with plaintiffs' belief in his wife's chastity. The object was no doubt to cause intense pain of mind to the plaintiff and to insult him in the heat of altercation, but it was part of that object to do it only by slandering his wife and children. Suppose the wife brought an action against defendant, would it be a good defence to say that, though she was the person slandered it was intended only to insult her husband. If not, the rule that a slanderer should not be liable to as many actions as there are relations would be violated. I would follow the principle laid down in Subbiyar v. Kristna Aiyar I. L. R. (1878) M. 383 Lukhumsey Rowji v. Hurbun Nursey I. L. R. (1881) B. 580 Daya v. Param Sulth I. L. R. (1888) A. 105. Setting aside the decrees of the Lower Courts, I dismiss the suit. But under the circumstances there will be no order as to costs throughout.

Best, J.

2. Though most unwilling to disturb the decrees, of the courts below in this case, I am constrained to come to the conclusion that the authorities cited leave us no option and that the plaintiff's suit must fail. I concur therefore in the decree proposed by my learned colleague.


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