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Boddu Ramayya Vs. Chitturi Surayya and ors. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCriminal
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1916Mad1105; (1915)28MLJ486
AppellantBoddu Ramayya
RespondentChitturi Surayya and ors.
Cases ReferredDistrict Judge. In Ram Charan Chandra Talukdar v. Taripulla I.L.R.
Excerpt:
- - we fail to see why a court to which by a government notification appeals are directed to be presented is not a court to which appeals ordinarily lie......sheika 16 c.w.n. 645 the court which heard the sanction appeal had only jurisdiction to hear civil appeals on transfer by the district judge. in ram charan chandra talukdar v. taripulla i.l.r. (1912) c 774 it was conceded that the high court had not empowered the subordinate judge to entertain appeals. the language of clause 7 (a) section 195 leaves no room for doubt that in madras all the subordinate judges who have been empowered by a notification to entertain civil appeals will be courts to which appeals ordinarily lie under section 195 of the code of civil procedure.2. on the merits, we feel no doubt that section 209 has no application. the word claim in that section cannot refer to a document produced in evidence to substantiate the relief asked for in the suit.3. as for.....
Judgment:

1. Mr. Narayamurthi takes exception to the jurisdiction of the Subordinate Judge of Ellore to hear the appeal. The District Munsif of Tanuku refused to grant sanction in this case against the plaintiff. Thereupon the defendant appealed to the Subordinate Judge to grant the sanction. It is not disputed that the Government have by a notification issued under the Civil Court's Act empowered Subordinate Judges to receive appeals direct in all cases where the Sub-Court is situated in a place different from that of the District Court. The Ellore Sub-Court is one of the Sub-Courts thus empowered and appeals from the Tanuku Court will lie to that court. It is argued by the learned Vakil for the appellant that as the Civil Courts Act directs all appeals to be presented to the District Court except in cases where there is a notification, the court to which appeals ordinarily lie is the District Court, within the meaning of Clause (6) of Section 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We fail to see why a Court to which by a Government notification appeals are directed to be presented is not a Court to which appeals ordinarily lie. It is with a view to settle this question and to meet the suggestion made in, In re Anant Ramchandra Lotlihar I.L.R. (1886) B. 188. that the term ordinarily refers to a tribunal to which the majority of the appeals are presented, that an explanation was added by the legislature in the Act of 1898. That explanation is a complete exposition of the term ordinarily and under it, the Sub-Court will be the forum to which appeals ordinarily lie. The decision in In the matter of Subbamma I.L.R 27 (1903) M 121 is not against this conclusion. Under Section 407 of the Code of Criminal Procedure appeals lie only to the District Magistrate, The appeals may be transferred for disposal by the District Magistrate to such First Class Magistrates as have been empowered by the Local Government to hear appeals. Therefore the First Class Magistrate is not a court to whom appeals lie either ordinarily or otherwise. In Bam Charan Chandra v. Taripulla Sheika 16 C.W.N. 645 the Court which heard the sanction appeal had only jurisdiction to hear civil appeals on transfer by the District Judge. In Ram Charan Chandra Talukdar v. Taripulla I.L.R. (1912) C 774 it was conceded that the High Court had not empowered the Subordinate Judge to entertain appeals. The language of Clause 7 (a) Section 195 leaves no room for doubt that in Madras all the Subordinate Judges who have been empowered by a notification to entertain civil appeals will be courts to which appeals ordinarily lie under Section 195 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

2. On the merits, we feel no doubt that Section 209 has no application. The word claim in that section cannot refer to a document produced in evidence to substantiate the relief asked for in the suit.

3. As for Section 471, the materials placed before us by the appellant do not enable us to say whether the document was produced on a summons as a witness and how it came to be marked for the plaintiff. Under these cirumstances, no case has been made out before us for granting sanction under that section.

4. We must dismiss the appeal with costs.


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