1. After the argument when this case was heard some weeks ago, we thought that the plaintiff might be allowed an opportunity of amending the plaint so as to make it one for consequential relief by obtaining possession of the trust property and otherwise; and we allowed it to stand over in order that the plaintiff may amend the plaint accordingly on payment of the stamp duty due in this and in the lower court. The plaintiff's Vakil now states that his client is not in a position to pay the stamp duty.
2. The claim of the plaintiff in the plaint is that the adopted son of the first defendant acquired an interest in the management of the trust. With reference to the devolution of the office of hereditary trustee vested in the first defendant only one of two views can be taken. Either it is governed by the analogy of the rules bearing on the holding of joint family property or by the analogy of the rules regulating the descent of separate property.
3. If the former be the correct view then the interest acquired by the plaintiff must prima facie be that of a joint trustee and as such he would be entitled inter alia to claim joint possession and management of the trust property and this suit for a mere declaratory decree is unsustainable with reference to Section 42 of the Specific Kelief Act. If however the proper view be that the devolution of the trust follows the descent of separate property then the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any right or interest in the office during the life time of the first defendant, or, at all events, so long as he is trustee. In either view, then, the present suit is unsustainable; and on these grounds, the appeal must be dismissed with costs of the second respondent.