1. The first question for decision is whether the razinama in question has, by the decisions of this Court, been finally held, as between the parties, to be a binding agreement. There can be no doubt, that the compromise referred to in Ex. I and V is the compromise, the terms of which are set out in Ex. IV and Ex. V clearly holds that compromise was valid respecting the only contention urged against it in the appeal. It is, however, contended that in the present case an appeal lies to the Privy Council, because the plaintiff claims a sum of more than Rs. 10,000, whereas in the suit of 1901, the sum claimed was less than Rs. 10,000 and that that fact brings the matter within the rule adopted by a full bench of this Court in Avanasi Goundan v. Nakammal I.L.R. (1908) M. 195 and Ex. V does not bar the trial in the present case of the validity of the compromise. But it is clear 011 the face of the plaint that the claim for Fasli 1311, amounting to Rs. 3,800, is barred by limitation and no attempt is made in the plaint or before us to show that the bar can be in any way removed. Consequently, the claim for Rs. 3,800 must be deducted to arrive at the amount in respect of which the plaintiff may have honestly conceived himself entitled to a decree, and the claim is thus less than Rs. 19,000. The case is, therefore, in respect of the amount of the claim, on the same footing as the suit No. 15 of 1901, and the decision in that suit is final between the parties. The plaintiff is, however, clearly entitled to a decree for the amount of rent reserved by the compromise, Rs. 1,000 a year for Faslis 1312, 1313, and 1314; and he has, by the alternative prayer in paragraph 9(a) of the plaint, in effect asked for such a decree in the event of decision against him as to the claim originally made. We modify the decree accordingly by giving the plaintiff a decree for Rs. 3,000 with interest at 6% from this date. As the litigation is entirely due to the plaintiff's persistent repudiation of the compromise, we disallow interest before decree, and seeing that he has endeavoured to evade the bar under Section 13 of the Code of 1882 by inserting in his plaint an obviously untenable claim, we think he cannot be allowed to recover any costs from the defendant and must pay the defendant's proportionate costs throughout.