1. This is an application for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council. It was admitted that the value of the subject-matter was below ten thousand rupees in the suit and in the appeal to this Court. Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyar made a faint suggestion that as at the time of the presentation of the petition, the decree amount with subsequent interest thereon aggregated to ten thousand Rupees, his client was entitled to appeal. This contention is clearly untenable.
2. The real question is whether the decree of this Court indirectly involved a claim or question respecting property over ten thousand rupees in value.
3. The suit was instituted for a legacy under the will of a testator. One of the questions related to the source from which the legacy was payable. If may be conceded that the reasons for our conclusion about the source would be applicable to other legacies payable under the will, and tint the amounts covered by all the legacies would exceed ten thousand rupees in value. It is, therefore, probable that our decision in the present case may be quoted as an authority in the cases that may be, but which have not yet been, instituted by other legatees. It is not suggested that our decision would conclude the other claims. Is the probability of our decision being relied upon in similar cases arising under the same will sufficient to bring it within the second clause of Section 110? We think not. That clause refers to a decree involving a claim. There must be something in the decree which affects the larger subject-matter, for example, there may be a suit to recover interest upon a heavy claim based on a document. In refusing interest, the Court may hold that the document is not genuine or is not binding. In such cases, although the claim for interest might relate to a sum below ten thousand rupees, the decree indirectly would involve the rejection of a claim for the principal amount as well. In effect, the smaller decree must have the effect of estopping either by the rule of res judicata or otherwise the party from claiming rights under the larger claim. The decision in Sri, Kishen Lal v. Kashmiro I.L.R. (1913) 35 A. 445, is reconcilable with this proposition. As for Afzal Hossain v. Mussamat Umda Bibi (1897) 1 C.W.N. 93, it is enough to point; out that the learned Judga3 granted leave under Section 109(c) and not under Section 110 of the Code. It was held in Moofti Mahammad Ubdoollah v. Baboo Motichand (1837) 5 W.R. (P.C.) 34 : 1 M.I.A. 363, that where separate suits, each being for a sum less than Rs. 10,000, but involving the same contention were decreed, no leave should be granted against either or both of them, as neither of them directly or indirectly involved a claim for over Rs. 10,000. Applying that analogy, supposing different suits were brought by different legatees, under the will in question and separate judgments were passed in each of them, although there may be a point common to all the suits, the decree in none of them would be regarded as satisfying the conditions of Section 110. It may be that where one common judgment is pronounced and no separate adjudication is necessary in the connected cases, the decision in the main case may be construed as involving a claim indirectly for the aggregate amount covered by all the cases. There is authority for this position, Byjnath v. Graham I.L.R. (1885) C. 740. The present case does not come within the principle of that case.
4. It may also be pointed out that the pronouncement which is complained of in our judgment only followed an earlier one by Subramania Aiyar, J. in Chinnam Rajamannar v. Tadikonda Ramachandra Rao I.L.R. (1902) M. 155 and that that decision was never sought to be appealed against.
5. For these reasons we are unable to grant the certificate.
6. The petition is rejected. No order as to costs.