1. In S.A. 1431 of 1905 - It is not necessary for us to decide whether, in a case where the Court finds under Section 491 of the Code of Civil Procedure that an attachment under Section 483 was applied for on insufficient grounds, the party against whom the order for attachment was made in a suit for compensation must prove that the defendant acted maliciously. In the present case the lower appellate Court finds on the facts that the 1st defendant acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. The lower appellate Court awarded the plaintiff Rs. 256 by way of special damages and a further sum of Rs. 250 for general damages for loss of credit and reputation. Sir V. Bhashyam Aiyangar has contended that general damages are not recoverable. He conceded that he had not been able to find any authority in support of this contention. It seems to us that an order under Section 483, Civil Procedure Code, where the application has been made on insufficient grounds, must necessarily cause damage to the credit and reputation of the party against whom the order is made, and we think general damages are recoverable. The principle of the decision in Quartz Hill Gold Mining Company v. Eyre (1833) 11 Q.B.D. 674 is, in our opinion, applicable to a case of this sort.
2. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.
3. On behalf of the 1st respondent a memorandum of objections was filed in this Court and a copy of the memorandum served upon the appellants under Section 561 of the Civil Procedure Code. Mr. Sundara Aiyar who appeared for the respondent, did not move his memorandum of objections, and he contended that in these circumstances, the Court had no jurisdiction to make any order with regard to it. His contention was that there was nothing before the Court with which it could deal judicially. A party may file his memorandum of objections without stamping it as it is not one of the documents to which Section 6 of the Court Fees Act applies. Under Section 16 of the Act, the Court cannot hear the objection until the proper stamp fee has been paid by the respondent. In the present case the memorandum of objections was not stamped, but though not stamped, it is before the Court, and the Court, in our opinion, has jurisdiction 'to deal with it, and the Court cannot be deprived of this jurisdiction because the respondent refrains from moving it. To hold otherwise might work serious hardship to appellant. On receiving a copy of the memorandum of objections an appellant may incur costs in connection with the memorandum in order that he may be prepared to fight it. Rule 88 of the Appellate Side Rules expressly provides that when a memorandum has been filed the appellant may file an additional list of documents which he desires to have translated and printed. If the Court has no jurisdiction to deal with a memorandum of objections which has not been moved, an appellant may have to pay out of his own pocket costs which he has incurred on account of the memorandum of objections which the respondent, for his own purposes, refrains from moving. The practice as to the form of order, when a memorandum of objections has not been stamped and has not been moved, does not seem to be uniform, but orders dismissing the memorandum, in such circumstances, have been made, and we are of opinion there is jurisdiction to inakd the order. If there is jurisdiction for making an order dismissing an application, there is, of course, jurisdiction to make an order dismissing it with costs. The memorandum of objections in the present case is dismissed with costs. In S.A. No. 1432 of 1905, the second appeal is dismissed.