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S. Natarajan and ors. Vs. V. Narasimha Aiyangar, Official Liquidator of the City Hygienic Milk Supply Co., Ltd. - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCompany
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1930Mad74; (1929)57MLJ723
AppellantS. Natarajan and ors.
RespondentV. Narasimha Aiyangar, Official Liquidator of the City Hygienic Milk Supply Co., Ltd.
Cases ReferredGorakhpur v. Jai Karan Lal I.L.R.
Excerpt:
- - we fail to see how sections 199 and 200 relied upon by mr......that would have had jurisdiction in respect of such company, if its registered office had been situate at tanjore.' what then is that court? the answer to this question is furnished by section 3, which reads thus:the court having jurisdiction under this act shall be the high court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situate.6. in other words, if the registered office of this company is situate at tanjore, the court having jurisdiction under the act, would be the high court. from the foregoing statement, it follows that the only court that can enforce the order in question against property at tanjore is the high court of madras. we do not propose to decide the question, in what manner, in the event of an application being made to the high.....
Judgment:

Venkatasubba Rao, J.

1. The short question is: What is the effect of Sections 199, 200 and 201 of the Indian Companies Act read with Section 3?

2. An order was made by the High Court under Section 187 ordering the payment by a contributory in respect of a call. He has property in the District of Tanjore against which the Liquidator can proceed. The latter accordingly produced the order before the District Judge and applied for its execution. The Judge overruling the objection of the contributory held that he had jurisdiction to enforce the order.

3. We have to decide whether the order of the District Judge is right. It is stated by both sides that the only relevant provisions of the Act bearing on the question are the four Sections to which we have referred. To them, therefore, we propose to confine our attention. The decision really turns on the meaning of Section 200 read in the light of Section 3.

4. The relevant portion of the former section runs thus:

Any order made by a Court for or in the course of the winding up of a company shall be enforced in any place in British India other than that in which such Court is situate, by the Court that would have had jurisdiction in respect of such company if the registered office of the company had been situate at such other place.

5. Let us apply the section to the facts of this case. The order was made by the High Court in the course of the winding up. It is sought to be enforced in Tanjore. Under the section, which is the Court that can enforce it? The answer is: 'The Court that would have had jurisdiction in respect of such company, if its registered office had been situate at Tanjore.' What then is that Court? The answer to this question is furnished by Section 3, which reads thus:

The Court having jurisdiction under this Act shall be the High Court having jurisdiction in the place at which the registered office of the company is situate.

6. In other words, if the registered office of this company is situate at Tanjore, the Court having jurisdiction under the Act, would be the High Court. From the foregoing statement, it follows that the only Court that can enforce the order in question against property at Tanjore is the High Court of Madras. We do not propose to decide the question, in what manner, in the event of an application being made to the High Court, is the order to he enforced, by direct action or by its being transmitted to the Tanjore Court? That is a point which does not arise at present. We fail to see how Sections 199 and 200 relied upon by Mr. Venkatachari support his contention. The section that confers jurisdiction is Section 200 and the other two Sections referred to by the learned Advocate merely deal with the mode of enforcing the orders. This, in our opinion, is the proper construction of these previous Sections.

7. The view we have taken receives support from Kayastha Trading and Banking Corporation, Gorakhpur v. Jai Karan Lal I.L.R.(1926) Pat. 132 Mr. Venkatachari asks what purpose then does Section 200 serve? The answer is simple. It obviously can apply to a case where an order made by the High Court of one province is to be enforced in another province; and as the Patna High Court in the decision we have cited has pointed out, in such a case it can only be enforced by the High Court of that other province.

8. Lastly, Mr. Venkatachari seeks to support the order of the Lower Court by relying upon Section 3, Clause (3), which says:

Nothing in this section shall invalidate a proceeding by reason of its being taken in a wrong Court.

9. It is very doubtful whether this clause applies to a case of this kind. In any case, it can have no application, as the Patna case has decided, when the objection was taken at the very commencement and at the proper time.

10. This appeal is allowed with costs.

11. The act of the Official Liquidator in applying to the Lower Court is bona fide and we, therefore, allow him to take his costs out of the estate.


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