Satyanarayana Rao, J.
1. Defendants 1 and 3 are the appellants in this second appeal. The lands in suit of the extent of 5 acres 20 cents were held by the plaintiff's predecessors as Devadasi service Inam for rendering service in a temple. After the enactment of Section 44-A, by Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Amendment Act (Madras Act v  of 1929), the Government disannexed the inam from the service and granted a title deed to the plaintiff on 13-4-1931 which is marked as Ex. P-1 in the case. The plaintiff instituted the suit for recovery of possession of the property from the defendants who resisted it on the ground that they had acquired title to the lands by adverse possession. Without referring to the long history of the previous proceedings in the suit, it would be sufficient for the purpose of disposing of this appeal to state that, on an issue remitted for trial by the District Court, it has now been finally determined that the inam grant consisted of both the warams. The only question that remains for disposal in this second appeal is the effect of the enfranchisement proceedings of the year 1931 on on the title of the plaintiff. The contention urged on behalf of the plaintiff in the Court below and which found favour with the learned District Judge is that the inam title deed of 1931 created a fresh title and that the defendants could not resist the suit for possession and rely on long possession which they held when the service tenure subsisted as the title, if any, which was then extinguished under the law of limitation is not the title on which the plaintiff is now seeking to recover possession of the property. It has also been found by the Courts below and it is not disputed before us that the defendants failed to establish a title by prescription as against the Government as they were not in possession for the required statutory period of sixty years. The case has, therefore, to be considered on the footing that the inam grant in favour of the plaintiff's predecessors-in-title comprised both the warams and that the grant is a service grant which was recognised in the inam proceedings of 1860 by the issue of a title deed--title deed No. 33--and that the defendants' only defence is long possession at a time when the service-tenure subsisted. If as contended by the plaintiff, she had acquired a fresh title under the enfranchisement proceedings of 1931 the defendants' prescriptive title which commenced and which was perfected when service-tenure was subsisting would be of no avail as it is not that title on which the plaintiff is now relying to seek to recover possession of the property.
2. It is no doubt true that an enfranchisement of an inam does not always imply a resumption of the original grant and a re-grant of the property. In order to determine in a given case the effect of an enfranchisement, on the title to the property, one has to examine the tenure on which the land was previously held and which was sought to be altered or substituted by a new tenure by the enfranchisement proceedings. If, as in the case of karnam service inam, the lands constitute emoluments attached to the office or as remuneration for the service and annexed to it, the enjoyment of the property follows the title to the office or the liability to render service. The succession to the service may be governed by the ordinary principles of the personal law of the parties, Hindu law as in the present case or may be governed by the Hindu law as modified by statute as in the case of karnam service inam lands. In the case of karnam service inams, it may be mentioned that the only statutory modification is that the claimant has to show that he is entitled to succeed to the office under the Hindu law on the principle of primogeniture but that by itself would not give him an automatic right to the office. His right has further to be recognised and an appointment to the office must be made by the Government because the statute relating to hereditary village officers lays down certain qualifications for a person to get himself appointed to the office even though he may be in the line of succession. In the other cases of service tenures, the succession to the tenure is governed by the ordinary rules of the personal law unless there are statutory modifications; and on principle the emolumentor property annexed to the service in either case follows the office or the service as the case may be. The title, therefore, to the enjoyment of the property rests not upon any independent title to the property but upon the right to the office or the service. There may be other classes of cases where a person holds property hereditarily but with an obligation attached to it to render certain services. In such a case, the title to the property is regulated by the personal law of the parties and wherever the property follows the obligation which is attached to that property also follows so that the title in such a case to the property and the right to enjoyment does not depend upon the right to the office or the duty to render service. To the latter classes of cases the decision in Narayana v. Chengalamma (Chittedipaliem case), 10 Mad. 1 belongs. To the former class the decision of the Judicial Committee in Venkatajagannadha, v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643: A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 96, belongs. In Chittedipaliam case, 10 Mad. 1, the dispute was whether the widow in whose favour an inam title was granted in 1865 after the inam was disannexed from service, acquired an absolute title to the property which was the subject-matter of the inam title deed or whether she held the property as a widow succeeding to her husband's estate. If it was her absolute property, the devolution would be different and would not follow the line of succession to the husband's estate. If however the title acquired under the inam title deed is not a fresh title but only a confirmation of the previous title which the husband held and which devolved upon her under the Hindu law the property would devolve after her death upon her husband's heirs. As the obligation to render service was merely an obligation attached to property it was held, having regard to the nature of the paliems tenure that the enfranchisement in favour of the widow did not confer upon her a fresh title to the lands. The unsettled paliems, it may be mentioned, which were considered in that case were never brought under Regulation XXV  of 1802 and were never settled, but notwithstanding that fact they stood exactly in the same position as regards the title to the property as the Zamindaries which were dealt with under that Regulation. So far as the proprietary rights are concerned, therefore, the unsettled paliems and the settled zamindaries stood on equal footing as was pointed both in Narayana v. Chengalamma, 10 Mad. 1 and also in Venkata Jagannada v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643 : A I.R. 1922 96, it was at one time thought--and it was the view of Bhashyam Aiyangar J.--that enfranchisement did not imply a resumption and are grant and that it was always a confirmation of an earlier title. This was the view taken by him, dissenting from the earlier Full Bench ruling in Venkata v. Rama, 8 Mad. 249 in the well-known case of Gunnaiyan v. Kamakshi Ayyar, 26 Mad. 339. His view was based largely upon an examination of the various regulations and also upon the decision in the Paliem case in Narayana v. Chengalamma 10 Mad. 1. This decision was confirmed by a Full Bench of this Court in Lakshmipathi v. B. Chelamayya, 30 Mad. 434: 17 M. L. J. 101 . When the matter went up to the Privy Council in Venkata Jagannada v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643: A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 96, the whole question was re-examined and it was held that Venkata v, Rama, 8 Mad. 249 was rightly decided and that the view of Bashyam Aiyangar J. in Gunnaiyan v. Kama-kshi Aiyar, 26 Mad. 339 was erroneous. The decision in Narayana v. Chengalamma, 10 Mad, 1, was explained by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee as standing on an entirely different footing from a case where the lands were attached to a service-tenure like the Karnam's office which was then under consideration. It was pointed out by their Lordships:
'When a Palayam was abolished in so far as the duty of rendering military service was concerned the estate was continued with all its hereditary incidents to the Palayagar in the same manner as if possession by a Zamindar. It was different with regard to the case of a karnam. A hereditary right in a karnam or his family can only, at the utmost, be said to consti-tute a certain spes (as he has only a right to get himself selected to the office) among persons within the area of selection of those eligible for the office. .... The power of selections rests with the administrative officials, who alone are judges of the eligibility of the karnam for the time being, and it is the settled law of Madras that the emoluments in the shape of lands follow the office ex necessitate. Otherwise the holder of the lands might be some person other than the holder of the office as already pointed out. The analogy fails.'
3. It is now contended on behalf of the appellants that the present case falls within the principle of Narayana v. Chengalamma, 10 Mad. 1, and that it differs from the decision in Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643 : A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 96 as there is no question of any selection of an heir to a Devadasi as in the case of a karnam's office. The language of Section 44-A makes it quite clear that the inam constitutes remuneration for the service to be performed by Devadasis and that it was annexed to that service by the Government. This view of the section is also supported in the present case by the facts themselves, for, we find that in the inam proceedings of 1862 the entry in the Inam Fair Register, Ex. P. 7 (a) shows that this inam was treated as a service inam to be continued to the pagoda so long as the service continued. In the light of the finding now reached by the Courts below that the grant comprises the land and not merely the melwaram, it must follow that the service tenure was attached not only to the melwaram but also the kudiwaram. The Government, therefore, by the enfranchisement proceedings of 1991, disannexed the inam, that is, both the warams from the service to which they were subject up to that date; the result of which was to place the land at the absolute disposal of the Government. They could have done anything with it--either granted the kudiwaram and the melwaram to some other person or might have continued the kudiwaram in the previous holder but subject to the payment of quit rent. It is the latter alternative that the Government elected to follow, having regard to their policy that long possession held by an inamdar should not be disturbed. In these circumstances, the only conclusion possible is that the enfranchisement created a fresh title to the land under the inam title deed of 1931. It is not as if the holder, i.e., the plaintiff and her predecessors, held the kudiwaram interest in the land under an independent title without reference to the Government and it was that title which the defendants had acquired under the law of prescription. The title to the melwaram and the title to the kudiwaram in the present case were held on the same footing from the Government, in the first instance under a service tenure and when it was put an end to, or, in other words, was resumed, the land must be taken to have been re-granted to the holder on payment of quit rent as stated in the inam title deed.
4. Section 44-A, Clause (1), provides for various kinds of grants. The first clause relates to granta of laud; the second clause relates to grants of melwaram alone and the third clause relates to grants partly of lands and partly of assignment of revenue. For all these kinds of grants provision is made to enfranchise and to grant an appropriate title deed. Of course the quit rent levied has to be paid to the temple for whose benefit the inam was originally granted. The argument now is that notwithstanding these provisions under Clause (6) of Section 44-A the right of a person who had acquired title by prescription are protected. Sub-clause (e) states :
'No order passed under Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall operate as a bar to the trial of any suit or issue relating to the right to enjoy the land or assignment of land revenue or produce derived from land as the case may be.'
It is difficult to read into this clause an exception in favour of and for the benefit of a person who had acquired title by prescription. It may be that this clause was intended to clear doubts regarding jurisdiction of civil Courts or it mayfoe that, though the enfranchisement was effected rightly, the grant of title deed really enures to the benefit of some other person than the grantee and there may be other questions which it is not possible for the Government to determine in a summary proceeding of the kind contemplated by Section 44- A. It was intended by this clause to leave open all such questions to be fought out in a regularly instituted suit in a civil Court. It is inconceivable, and it is impossible, in my opinion, to think or to read into this section a saving of the rights in favour of a person claiming that he had acquired title to the property by adverse possession. I say it is impossible because the title which was acquired by prescription and which by the law of limitation operating as a statutory conveyance was the title to the kudiwaram held on service tenure which the predecessor-in-title of the plaintiff possessed in the inam. That tenure was now put an end to by a competent authority and there is an end of the title of the defendants. That title cannot be revived and is not intended to be revived by anything that is stated in Clause (6) of the section. Unless there is an express provision and a clear intention to save such rights, one cannot read into the sub-clause permitting a right of suit an exception in favour of such rights. It is, therefore, impossible for the defendants to sustain the plea that their title by adverse possession would be of avail even against the title which the plaintiff had derived under the inam title deed of 1931. It cannot be disputed that by his annexing the service from the land in 1931 which is an act of enfranchisement the land became available to the Government freed from any previous title which was not available against the Government and it was at theirSibsolute disposal and they could have granted it, as stated already, to any person. The inam title deed therefore recognised the right of the plaintiff to the kudiwaram as well as the melwaram in the properties subject to the payment of the quit rent mentioned in the title deed. In my opinion, therefore, if the distinction between the title to the property and the title to office and service which the property follows for enjoyment by the holder of the office or the person rendering the service is kept in mind there is no difficulty in determining the question when and under what circumstances an enfranchisement of a service inam by Government would have the effect of creating a fresh title upon the grantee. The rules framed by the local Government under the Act also make it clear that when an enfranchisement is made under this section the old title deed should be cancelled and a new title deed should be granted and that is what has been done in this case. Theold title deed 33 was cancelled and in its stead new title deed 3 was granted to the plaintiff.
5. Reference was made in the course of the arguments to a decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J., sitting as a single Judge reported in M. Yenadi v. Ramalakshmamma, : AIR1946Mad206 , in which the learned Judge if I may say so with respect laid down very broadly that as regards the Devadasi service inams there is no rule that the enfranchisement under Section 44-A now made extinguishes the old title and creates a new one. The learned Judge observes that the rule that the enfranchisement of service inam implies a resumption and a re-grant does not apply to all service inams irrespective of their nature, One need not quarrel with this statement of the law because, as has been pointed out already, it is not in every case that the enfranchisement has the effect of resumption and re-grant. It depends upon, no doubt the extent of the grant and the tenure on which the inam was held. If the grant was only of the melwaram, the kudiwaram interest having already been vested in the grantee, the enfranchisement would have no effect upon the kudiwaram interest in the land. The grantee and his or her successors would continue to hold the kudiwaram interest in the same right as before and enfranchisement does not touch it. Again, the service may be an obligation merely attached to the property and it may follow the title to the property as in the case of Paliem tenures, or, as in the present case, it might depend upon the title to the service or the office, in which case if the service is put an end to and a title deed is granted that title would operate as a fresh grant. The extent of the re-grant has to be determined with reference to what was originally granted as an inam because it was only what was granted by the Government that the Government are entitled to resume and re-grant. If the grant was of the fullest extent, that is, the land, itself, it would be perfectly open to them to put an end to the entire grant. All these questions have to be answered with reference to the facts of each case and no exception, therefore, can be taken to the statement of one learned Judge that in all cases it cannot be said that the enfranchisement has the effect of operating as a resumption and a re-grant. But with reference to the learned Judge's observation in the case regarding the Devadasi service inams, it is not clear even from the printed records in the case whether the grant in that case was of the land itself or whether it was of melwaram alone. If it was of melwaram alone, it may be that most of the remarks of the learned Judge would be justified as the enfranchisement would not have the effect, to any extent, of touching kudiwaraminterest in the land. If, on the other hand, the learned Judge intended to lay down that, notwithstanding the clear language of Section 44-A, indicating that the land was attached to the service and was annexed to it, the effect of enfranchisement in such a case would not have the effect of creating a frash title. I must respectfully differ from the view of the learned Judge. The learned Judge also observed that most of the decisions which were quoted before him related to inams held by village officers and the view that enfranchisement in such cases had the effect of operating as resumption and a re-grant was justified by some rule of public policy. I do not think, however, that in disposing of the case in Venkata, Jagannadha v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643 : A.I.R. 1923 P. C. 96, the Judicial Committee rested their decision on any rule ofpublic policy. It was merely based upon the nature of the title to the property which was always dependent upon the right to the office. If the right to the office was terminated by enfranchisement the right to the properties also followed suit and the grant subsequently made would confer a fresh title upon the grantee. The learned Judge also refers to the language of Section 44-A, Sub-clause (6) as supporting his view. For the reasons stated already with references to this clause. I fail to see how this clause supports the view that enfranchisement does not extinguish the old title and create a new title. In my judgment, the decision of the Saarned District Judge in the present case that the plaintiff had acquired a fresh title under the inam proceedings of 1931 and that she is entitled to a decree for possession of the properties is perfectly justified.
6. The result is that the second appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.
7. Yiswanatha Sastri J.--The cage having been referred to a Bench at the instance of Panchapagesa Sastri J. on account of the importance of the question of law involved, I would add a few words of my own.
8. Section 44-A, Madras Act II  of 1927,was inserted by Section 2, Amending Act v  of 1929, with a view to discourage and abolish theinstitution of Devadasis, the Legislature having been of the opinion that the dedication of young girls for service in Hindu temples had been attended with results injurious to the community and degrading to the individuals concerned. Under the section, the Provincial GovernmentIS enjoined to enfranchise lands held by Deva-dasis as remuneration for their services, that is to say free the lands from the condition of service and make a fresh grant thereof subject to the levying of rent or quit rent as prescribed in the section. The inam with which we are concerned in the present case is a Devadasi inam grantedto the predecessors-in-title of the plaintiff as remuneration for the performance of services in a Hindu temple. The original grant was, as is now found, on the admission of the parties, of the land itself and not merely of the assessment or the land revenue. The final order of the Inam Commissioner dated 26-6-1862 was to the effect that the lands of the extent of 5 acres 56 cents were to be continued to the pagoda so long as the service in the temple was rendered by the grantees and their descendants. In 1931, the Government, purporting to act under Section 44-A, of Act II  of 1927, enfranchised the inam and granted a title deed Ex. P-1 to the plaintiff. It is now found by the Courts below, and this conclusion is not disputed, thai the defendants and their predecessors-in-title had acquired by prescription a right to a permanent tenancy as against the inamdars prior to 1931, It is also found that the defendants had not acquired a a title against the Government by adverse possession for a period of sixty years. The question for our decision is whether the title of the defendants, such as it was, was extinguished by reason of the enfranchisement proceedings which resulted in the issue of a fresh title deed Ex. P-1 by the Provincial Government in favour of the plaintiff in 1931 or whether on [the strength of their long possession before 1931 they could resist the plaintiff's claim based on Ex. P-1.
9. It is now settled that, in the case of service inama, enfranchisement consists in the giving up of the Government's rights in the lands previously held on service tenure on payment of such quit rent as may be fixed and in disannexing the land from the office and the services incidental thereto, The title deed issued by the Inam Commissioner purports to grant the land to the plaintiff as a free-hold or absolute property. Ex facie, it is a fresh grant of the land though the previous service holder happens to be the grantee. In Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643 : A. I. R.1922 P. C. 96, the Judicial Committee held, approving of the earlier decisions of this Court and overruling the later decisions, a reference to which is unnecessary is view of the definite pronouncement of the Board, that on the enfranchisement of karnam service inam lands, by the imposition of a quit rent in lieu of services and the grant of an inam title deed confirming the lands to the grantee, his representatives and assigns, the lands so enfranchised and confirmed, became the absolute property of the grantee and were free from any claims on the part of the other members of the grantee's family. In other words, it was held that there was an extinction of the antecedent tenure and title on which the lands were held and a fresh grant of the lands by theGovernment as the lawful owner thereof, to the new grantee. The usual form of the title deed to which Ex. P.1 in the present case conforms will be found at p. 648 of the report in Venkata, Jagannadha v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643 : A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 96. This decision of the Judicial Committee was followed by this Court in Gouri Kantam v. Ramamurthi, 46 M. l. J. 482 : A. I. R. 1924 Mad. 783, where Wallace J. held that the enfranchisement of a service inam and the issue of an inam title deed created a fresh title in the grantee. This case is, in my opinion, decisive against the appellants. Wallace J., decided that persons in the position of the present appellants who claim adversely to the ex facie import of the inam title dead granted as a result of enfranchisement, cannot succeed on the strength of a prescriptive title unless they show that, by adverse possession againat the Government for sixty years prior to the enfranchisement and the grant of freehold title, they had acquired a prescriptive title to the service inam lands. All that the defendants have shown here is a prescriptive title to a permanent tenancy against the holder of the office but not as against the Government on the date of Ex. P-1. In Ramanna v. Venkatanarayana, 52 M. L. J. 52; A. I. R. 1927 Mad. 801, Devadoss J. following the decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643 : A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 96 held that the effect of enfranchisement of a karnam service inam was to do away with the rights and titles to the property acquired before the date of the enfranchisement. The learned Judge expressed his view in these terms :
'When the Government resumes a service inam all the interests of persons who have acquired title prior to the date of enfranchisement cease to have any effect, and the person in whose name title is made out after enfranchisement gets it free of the interests which other persons had in the property before the date of enfranchisement.'
This statement of the law may have to be qualified to some extent with reference to cases where third persons had acquired a prescriptive title to the lands by adverse possession as against the Government itself for over sixty years prior to the enfranchisement proceedings.
10. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. in M. Yenadi v. Ramalakshmamma : AIR1946Mad307 held that the rule that where a service inam is resumed there is an extinction of the original title and a re-grant which constitutes the root of a fresh title did not apply to a devadasi inam and held that its enfranchisement under Section 44-A of Madras Act II  of 1927 had not the effect of extinguishing the antecedent title to the lands resumed or of creating a fresh title in the grantee. There is noindication in the judgment of the learned Judge as to how or on what basis service inams should be differentiated for the purpose of applying or departing from the rule referred to by him. The learned Judge, though he does not refer to the previous decisions, must have had them in mind when he made this observation, As a statement of the law applicable to service iname other than a karnam service inam which the learned Judge excludes from consideration, it is, in my opinion, too wide and must be taken subject to the qualifications and limitations pointed out in the judgment just now delivered by my learned brother. The effect of enfranchisement depends on the nature and extent of the original grant, i.e., whether it was of the land itself or the assessment alone and the nature of the tenure on which the land was held. The appellants, however, rely on this decision which, according to them, rules the present case which relates to a devadasi inam. I am unable, however, to accept it as a correct statement of the law in this respect.
11. There is a distinction between personal inams and inams granted subject to the obligation of a service on the one hand and inams granted as the remuneration of an office, that is to say, for the rendering of services in connection with public, religious or charitable institutions or for services of a public nature like karnam service. In the case of service inams like the present, the land goes with and follows the office and is an emolument of the office. Section 44-A of Act II  of 1927 speaks of inam lands as the remuneration for the services, the lands being granted in respect of or annexed to such services. The office, involving as it does, the duty to perform the service, might devolve according to the personal law of the incumbent subject, however, to statutory provisions. The land follows the devolution of the office. In the case of a devadasi inam the ordinary personal law governs the succession to the office and there is no need for a recognition or approval by the Government on each devolution of the office just as there is in the case of a karnam service inam where the devolution of the office is subject to the law of primogeniture, the posses-sion of certain statutory qualifications and the recognition and acceptance by the Government of the office-holder. In either case the land is annexed to and follows the devolution of the office, If the Government, the owner of the land, does not require the service, it is open to it to resume the land, or in other words, to disannex the office from the inam. In such cases there is a resumption and regrant. Where however property is held as a personal inam with an obligation of rendering service, the property devolveson the heirs and successors of the grantee and the obligation attached to the ownership of property goes with it. The right to enjoy the property does not go with any office and the right devolves under the ordinary law. To this class belonged zamindaris and paliems. See the Marangapuri case Collector of Trichinoply v. Lek Kamani, 1 I. A. 283 : 14 Beng. L. R. 115 . In the case of estates of large magnitude which carried with them an obligation on the part of the grantees to render some kind of police or military service, the Government released the grantees from the obligation of service by taking action under Regulation XXV [253 of 1802 and permanently settling the peshcush. In the case of estates which had not been settled under Regulation XXV [253 of 1802 like the Chittedupaliem which was the subject-matter of the decision in Narayana v. Chenyalamma, 10 Mad. 1, the Government brought about the same result by resorting to the procedure under the inam settlement. In either case there was a dispensing with the obligation of service on the part of the grantee or his descendant and there was no question of resumption or re-grant or the acquisition of a fresh title by the grantee. There was only a confirmation of the previous title and the proper. ty continues to devolve by the ordinary law of inheritance. The abolition of the service does not make any difference in the devolution of the property according to the ordinary law of inheritance. In the case of personal inama or grants subject to a mere obligation of rendering services, enfranchisement involves a mere release of the service obligation and of the reversionary rights of the Government. In the case of a service inam, which is enfranchised, there is a resumption by the Government and a re-grant of it though, in practice and as a matter of policy, the holder of the office at the time of enfranchisement is usually chosen as the grantee. At the time of the inam settlement, holders of personal inams, whether hereditary or conditional in their terms, were allowed to convert their obligation by way of services and reduce their tenure into a permanent freehold with full powers of alienation, upon reasonable terms involving a payment in commutation of the re-versionary rights of the Government. In the case of service inama the theory has been that the ownership is always with the Government, the office-holder merely enjoying the income as his emoluments or wages. The right of the office-holder to the enjoyment of the usufruct of the land is co-extensive with the duration or tenure of his office and consistently with this theory, if the office is detached from the land and there is an enfranchisement of the service inam, it has the effect of a resumption and re-grant to the person named in the inam title deed. In the present case, the original inam grand was of the land itself and the grantee bad no independent right to the kudiwaram interest. The land with both waram rights had been grant-ed on a service tenure. When the service tenure was put an find to, and the land was resumed, the resumption operated on both the warams, So did the fresh grant of 1931, EX. P. 1. The power of the Government to remove an officeholder and resume the land is assumed to exist and so long as the land is enjoyed as a remuneration for the performance of the duties of the office, the office holder has not got the full dominion over the land. It is for this reason that a series of decisions of this Court culminating in the decision of the Full Bench in Anjeneyulu v. Sri Venugopala Rice Mills Ltd., 45 Mad. 620: A. I. R. 1922 Mad. 197 , took the view that service inam lauds forming the emoluments of an office attached to a temple, were not alienable or liable to be attached and sold in execution of a decree against the inamdar. The Government would have a right to resume possession of such service inam land on its alienation by the office-holder. The Government could resume the inam if by prescription against the office-holder a stranger had acquired title to the inam lands. The decision of the Judicial Committee in Venkata Jagannadha v. Veerabadrayya, 44 Mad. 643: A. I. R. 1922 P. C. 96 no doubt related to a karnam service inam where the eligibility of a person for the office was the subject of statutory enactment, but their Lordships did not real their conclusion on this ground alone. Rather they stressed the general principle that the land was appurtenant to and an appanage of the office, inalienable by the office-holder and designed to be the emolument of the office in whosoever hands the office might pass at the instance of the Revenue authorities. The office-holders in a temple who enjoy inam lands as remuneration for their services are more or less in the same position. They are subject to the disciplinary control of the trustees and are liable to be removed for misconduct. The office is one which has got duties attached to it in the performance of which the public are interested and there is no difference in principle between the office now in question and a karnam's office. A devadasi mam is really a service inam and the service at least in legal theory, if not in actual practice, is as much a religious service in connection with the temple as the service of an archaka, a paricha-raka, a piper or other hereditary temple servants. 12. Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. in the decision already cited and appellants in their arguments in this case, relied upon Section 44-A, Sub-section (6) of Act II  of 1927 which has been reproducedin the judgment of my learned brother. I fail to see how this provision supports the conclusion of the learned Judge or the contention of the appellants. Section 44-A is a comprehensive statement with some modifications of the relevant standing order of the Board of Revenue with reference to the enfranchisement of inams and the result of such enfranchisement. Act VIII  of 1869 enacted that title deeds issued by the Government through the Inam Commissioner were not meant to deprive, limit, encumber or destroy the rights of any description of holders or occupiers of land or to affect the interest of any person other than the holder of the inam. Section 44-A, Sub-section (6) is an analogous provision. If, for instance, by a mistake the title deed had been issued to a wrong person, it is open to the person lawfully entitled to have the error rectified by a suit. If a person had a right of permanent occupancy in the land in his own right, only the melwaram or the assessment having been granted in inam and subsequently resumed by the Government, he could sue to establish his rights as against the grantee of the fresh inam title deed after enfranchisement, if the latter asserts title to both warams. If on the date of the enfranchisement a person had acquired no title as against the Government to the land and the inam is resumed and the land granted by Government under a title-deed he would have no right of action against the grantee. The rights which he might have acquired as against the inamdar before the enfranchisement are wiped out by the enfranchisement sanctioned by Section 44-A of the Act which involves a resumption and re-grant of the land.
13. For these reasons, I agree with my learned brother in his conclusion.