Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.
1. Section 265 of the Contract Act declares the right of a partner, on the determination of the partnership, to apply to a Court to wind up the Partnership and distribute the assets. It is optional with him to seek this relief or not : if he elects to do so, the explanation declares the Court to which he must have recourse. If the clause containing the explanation were taken from the place it occupies in the Contract Act and carried into the Procedure Code, there could be no doubt that its effect would be to confine the jurisdiction to grant the relief indicated in the section to Courts not inferior to Courts of a particular class. Nor can the effect of the clause be otherwise when it is read with the Procedure Code. Act VIII of 1859, in declaring the general jurisdiction of Civil Courts, recognised limitations in jurisdiction prescribed or thereafter to be prescribed by other laws. Act X of 1877, Sections 16 and 17, also recognizes such limitations.
2. There are numerous Acts which create or regulate civil remedies and eon-fine jurisdiction to the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or the 'District Court,' for instance the Pagoda Act, Succession Act, Companies Act, the Trusts Act II of 1882, Section 34.* The power to appoint a receiver--a measure frequently necessary in suits for winding up partnerships--is by the Code itself confined to a High Court or District Court.
3. The particular point now before the Court--the competency of a Court subordinate to the District Court to entertain a suit under the 265th Section of the Contract Act--was not raised or determined in Ramasami v. Theruvengada-sami I.L.R. 1 Mad. 340 and the conclusion at which we arrive is in accordance with two unreported cases decided by this Court--R.A. 56 of 1880, C.M.A. 258 of 1877--and with the more recent rulings of the Calcutta High Court in Prosad Doss Mullick v. Russick Lall Mullick I.L.R. 7 Cal. 157 and in Ram Chunder Shaha v. Manick Chunder Banikya I.L.R. 7 Cal. 428.
4. It sufficiently appears from the relief sought that the plaintiff sought the winding up of the partnership and a distribution of the profits.
5. The District Munsif should not have dismissed the suit but return the plaint for presentation to the proper Court, and the Judge, instead of remanding the suit, should have returned the plaint with that direction.
6. Setting aside the order of the Judge and the decree of the Munsif, we direct that the plaint be returned accordingly.
* Eight to apply to Court for opinion in management of trust property.
[Section 34:-Any trustee may, without instituting a suit, apply by petition to a principal Civil Court or original jurisdiction for its opinion, advice or direction on any present questions respecting the management or administration of the trust property other than questions of detail, difficulty or importance, not proper in the opinion of the Court for summary disposal.
A copy of such petition shall be served upon, and the hearing thereof may be attended by, such of the persons interested in the application as the Court thinks fit.
The trustee stating in good faith the facts in such petition and acting upon the opinion, advice or direction given by the Court shall be deemed, so far as regards his own responsibility to have discharged his duty as such trustee in the subject-matter of the application.
The costs of every application under this section shall be in the discretion of the Court to which it is made.]