1. It is perfectly clear from Exhibit II that the grandfather of the plaintiff gave the land in dispute to his second wife, the late Kandiakkal. There is, however, nothing in that document to show that the transfer was made subsequent to the date on which the Transfer of Property Act came into force. The defendant pleaded that the gift was made about 25 years ago, and in such circumstances it lay on the plaintiff who impeaches the gift to show that it was made after the Transfer of Property Act came into force. As there is no evidence on this point on behalf of the plaintiff, we think the lower courts were in error in proceeding on the view that the transfer was invalid, as it was not made under a registered instrument as required by the Transfer of Property Act. As the plaintiff was not in existence, at the time of the transfer and as his father assented to the transfer, it is not necessary for the defendant to rely on prescription. If any question of prescription arose here, we could not say that we were prepared to accept the contention that possession held for over the statutory period under an alleged title, which is found to be invalid or unfounded, would not avail the party holding the possession.
2. The view suggested in the passage in the case of Raja Haimun Chull Singh v. Koomer Gunsheam Sing 5 W.R.P.C. 69 to which our attention has been called, has apparently been departed from by the Judicial Committee itself in several subsequent decisions. It is also not reconcilable with numerous decisions of this and other High Courts. As to the case of Labrador Co. v. The Queen (1823) A.C. 104 it will be seen if the facts thereof be not overlooked that there is no real conflict between our own view and the ruling in that case given with reference to the provision of the French, law a person cannot acquire by prescription against his own title in this way that a person cannot himself change the cause and nature of his possession (Cachard's Civil Code, 508). As, however, no question of prescription arises in this case, it is not necessary to say more on the point. It was next urged, on behalf of the plaintiff, that, assuming the gift is not invalid under the Transfer of Property Act, the donee took only a life estate and, therefore, the alienation in favour of the defendant is not binding on the plaintiff. But the estate, which the grantee took on the hypothesis suggested for the plaintiff, must be taken to be not an estate for life, but the limited estate of a female known to the Hindu Law, and the person entitled to the property on Kandiakkal's death is not the plaintiff but his father. We are unable to agree in the contention that this right to succeed to the property on Kandiakkal's death was intended to be transferred or was transferred to the plaintiff under the partition deed, Exhibit A, which was executed in Kandiakkal's life-time, and which ignores her right and deals with the property as part of the family estate in the possession of the family. The plaintiff's suit was, therefore, not maintainable. The second appeal fails and we dismiss it with costs.