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Yamuna Bai Rani Sahiba Vs. Solayya Kavundan - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Judge
Reported in(1901)ILR24Mad339
AppellantYamuna Bai Rani Sahiba
RespondentSolayya Kavundan
Excerpt:
rent recovery act (madras) - act viii of 1865, section 78--six months from date of cause of action--illegal attachment by landholder of tenant's property--retention for more than six months--continuing wrong--limitation. - .....the cause of action arose within six months prior to the date of the institution of the suit. what happened was that the seizure was effected in may 1896, but the effects remained in the defendant's possession until a later date within the six months.3. we are of opinion that the term cause of action used in section 78 of the rent recovery act (viii of 1865) must be taken to be used in the ordinary sense, for the intention was to preserve the ordinary rights of action, subject only to the two provisos. assuming that the detention is an act professedly done under the authority of the act so as to make section 78 of the act applicable, we think that the detention was a continuing wrong and that therefore the suit was not barred by that section. it was certainly not barred by the provision.....
Judgment:

1. As to the points raised by the first issue, it was not taken in the lower Appellate Court and whether or not the order by the Revenue officer is conclusive as to the legality of the distraint, there is certainly evidence to show that it was illegal.

2. On the question of limitation we have to consider whether the cause of action arose within six months prior to the date of the institution of the suit. What happened was that the seizure was effected in May 1896, but the effects remained in the defendant's possession until a later date within the six months.

3. We are of opinion that the term cause of action used in Section 78 of the Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865) must be taken to be used in the ordinary sense, for the intention was to preserve the ordinary rights of action, subject only to the two provisos. Assuming that the detention is an act professedly done under the authority of the Act so as to make Section 78 of the Act applicable, we think that the detention was a continuing wrong and that therefore the suit was not barred by that section. It was certainly not barred by the provision of the general law of limitation, for according to the Limitation Act (XV of 1877), a period of one year calculated from the date of the distress is allowed and that period had not elapsed when the suit was filed. We dismiss the appeal with costs.


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