Horace Owen Compton Beasley, Kt., C.J.
1. The question raised in this appeal is whether the District Munsif's Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. It was a suit claiming a declaration that the plaintiff was the nearest reversioner to the first defendant's husband (deceased) after the first defendant's death and that certain alienations made by the first defendant in favour of some of the defendants were not valid and supported by consideration and not binding upon the reversionary right of the plaintiff. The second relief claimed was a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from cutting down the fruit trees, etc. An issue was raised with regard to jurisdiction and the learned District Munsif held that the suit had been properly valued for purposes of jurisdiction and proceeded to decide the case on its merits. He held that the alienation by sale of all the properties in her possession by the widow was invalid and not binding upon the reversionary interest. With regard to the permanent injunction claimed, this was not granted by him and he appears to have considered the case merely from the point of view of a claim against the widow of having wasted the property by cutting down trees. Apparently the plaintiff was not in possession of any evidence of waste being committed by the other defendants and merely sought to show that the widow herself had cut down trees. The District Munsif held that there was no satisfactory proof of this and accordingly disallowed the claim for an injunction. Having regard to the fact that in all probability no evidence whatever was led with regard to the other defendants having cut down trees on the property he does not deal with that part of the case but it is quite obvious from the plaint that a permanent injunction was sought for against all the defendants on the ground that they were cutting down trees. On appeal, the lower Appellate Court, following the decision in Veeramma v. Butchaiah (1926) 52 M.L.J. 381 held that the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit as the valuation to be adopted for the purposes of jurisdiction in such a suit for a declaration was the market value of the property. The question here is whether the two reliefs sought, namely, the declaration that the alienations were not binding on the reversionary interest and the permanent injunction are necessarily connected. It was argued here that these reliefs were independent reliefs, that the plaintiff could have sued for the declaration without necessarily asking for the injunction or that he could have sued for injunction without asking for the declaration. On the other hand, it is argued that the prayer for an injunction was consequential on the granting of the declaration. I have got to consider really whether the plaintiff here could have got his injunction against all the defendants without getting a declaration that the alienations were not binding upon the reversionary interest. Had the claim for injunction been limited to one against the widow, the limited owner and had she been in possession of the property I should have accepted the respondent's argument that a person claiming to be a reversioner is entitled either to get a declaration that the alienation or acts of the limited owner are invalid and not binding upon the reversionary interest or to restrain such acts by the limited owner by an injunction. In this case the widow sold all the properties in her possession. She therefore was not in possession of the properties at all and she was not a person who was even capable of committing waste in the shape of cutting down trees. Only those persons in possession could do that. Therefore really the plaintiff's claim is to restrain by injunction the alienees who are in possession of the property and not the limited owner at all. Then the question for consideration is, could the plaintiff have sought an injunction against these persons who are strangers without first of all establishing his right to do so. In my view, he had to establish his right and in order to establish his right he had to get the declaration sought for, namely, that the alienations were invalid and not binding upon the reversionary interest. I think that is quite obvious. Therefore, he could not get the second relief without getting the first. It was a relief which was necessarily connected with the first and, for these reasons, I am of the opinion that the District Munsif was right in holding that the valuation of the suit was such as to give him jurisdiction. That being so, the order of the lower Appellate Court must be set aside and the case remanded to the lower Appellate Court for disposal of the remaining points. The appellant will get his costs of this appeal. The costs in the lower Appellate Court will abide the result of the appeal there.