1. This is a suit to enforce the lien possessed by a vendor of immovable property in respect of unpaid purchase-money. The Court of First Instance decided that the case fell within Article, 111 of the Limitation Act. But the Lower Appellate Court following Virchand Lalchand v. Kwmaji I.L.R., 18 B., 48 held that Article 132 applied, Now Article Ill refers solely and in unmistakable terms to suits such as the present, while Article 132 deals with suits for money charged upon immovable property generally. In the case cited above, no reasons were stated as to why the learned Judges arrived at the conclusion that Article Ill was inapplicable to cases similar to this; and that conclusion is opposed to the well established canon rule of interpretation that, as a rule, general provisions do not derogate from special provisions, but that the latter do derogate from the former. Generalia Specialiabus non derogant; Specialia derogant generalibus. It is scarcely necessary to observe that if Article Ill does not apply to such suits as the present, it is impossible to see to what suits it would apply. With all deference to the very learned Judges who decided the case which the lower appellate Court followed, we must hold that the class of suits to which the present belongs, falls under the special provision, viz., Article 111, and that class is excluded from the comparatively general Article 132, applicable to eases of money charged on immovable property not specially provided for in the Act.
2. In this view, the suit, having been brought after the expiry of 3 years from the date mentioned in Col, 3 of Article Ill, was clearly barred. We, therefore, allow the appeal and reverse the decree of the lower appellate Court and restore that of the District Munsif. The respondents must pay the appellants' costs in this and the lower appellate Court.