Charles A. Turner, Kt., C.J.
1. Some lands, known as Singamvalasa, were held by Sridara Kodanda Rau, who died leaving a widow, Venkamma, and four daughters, Janikamma, Bhagamma, Narasamma, and Ramayamma. The lands passed to his widow who survived her daughters. Bhagamma and Ramayamma had died without issue. Janikamma and Narasamma had left male issue, who succeeded on their grandmother's death. The children of Narasamma then living were a son, Chinna Narasinga Rau, and a daughter, Chatti Chalamanna, the appellant. Narasinga Rau, on the 28th April 1845, executed a deed attested by three witnesses and described as a sanad. This deed recited that the appellant had requested her brother to give her something from the produce of the Singamvalasa lands inherited from his grandmother and witnessed that consequently Narasinga Rau agreed to pay to the appellant during her life, and after her death to her daughter, the sum of Rupees 10 from the harvest of the year Krodi on the 30th of Magha in each year.
2. It is to be inferred from the language of the deed that Narasinga Rau, who had full power over his share, intended to create a charge on the produce of the estate he had inherited. Such a charge would be known to the Hindu Law as a corrody; Stokes' Dayabhaga, Chapter 2, paragraph 13, and note. The payment was regularly made by Narasinga Rau during his life. His widow, to whom his estate has descended, has refused to continue the payment, and the appellant has sued for a declaration of her right to recover it and for arrears. The Munsif decreed the claim: the Lower Appellate Court reversed the Munsif's decree and dismissed the claim, accepting the plea that the deed created a mere promise and was without consideration. The sole consideration for the deed was, it may be admitted, natural love and affection, but the transaction was more than a mere promise. Narasinga Rau created a valid charge on the profits of the land, which, under the Hindu Law, would be supported as a corrody, and under the English law as a settlement. I see no reason why effect should not be given to his solemn act. The decree of the lower Appellate Court is reversed and that of the Munsif restored with costs.
Muttusami Ayyar, J.
3. This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the appellant upon a document executed in her favour by her brother Chinna Narasinga Rau on the 28th April 1845. By this document he agreed to pay his sister, the Appellant, Rs. 10 every year during the term of her natural life. It purports to be a sanad and is attested by witnesses. It recites as a motive for the grant that the appellant asked her brother to give her something every year out of the produce of Singamvalasa land inherited from their mother's mother. I see no reason to doubt that there was no consideration other than natural love, and that the transaction was at its inception only a gift. I observe, however, that the document was acted upon from the date of its execution to 1878-79 and during the lifetime of Narasinga Rau. His widow, the respondent, having since declined to pay the annuity on the ground that the transaction was a gratuitous promise, the appellant brought this suit. The document sufficiently indicates that the donor intended that the gift should be irrevocable. He designates it to be a sanad probably to suggest that the allowance was intended to be irrevocable at pleasure, and expresses that intention distinctly by promising to pay the allowance during the appellant's life, and, after her death, to her daughters. His subsequent conduct in making the stipulated payment during his life confirms the view that such was his intention. A solemn and binding promise in this form, equivalent to a declaration of trust, is not unknown to the Hindu Law. A corrody, it is said in Dayabhaga, Chapter II, paragraph 13, signifies what is fixed in this form, 'I will give that in every month of Kartiki.' The Sanscrit term is 'Nibanda,' and it is explained by the Commentator, Srikrishna, as signifying anything which has been promised as deliverable annually or monthly or at any other fixed period (see Note to Dayabhaga, Chapter II, paragraph 13).
4. I also find that, by Section 25,* Clause 1 of the Contract Act, a gift may be made from natural love or affection so as not to be revocable though no transfer of possession may have been made. I further think that, where an incorporeal right is the subject-matter of a gift, the only possession that is possible in the nature of the case is that prescribed for the transfer by way of gift of choses-in action. The test in each case is whether, under the circumstances, the donor has sufficiently indicated an intention that the transfer should take effect as a corrody and with that intention has done all that is practicable by way of transferring such indicia of property as may be in existence.
5. As I am of opinion that the transaction before us was intended to be a corrody, and as the issue of a formal sanad is the only mode in which that intention can be carried out in the special circumstances of the case, I agree that this appeal must be allowed, the decree of the Lower Appellate Court set aside, and that of the Court of First Instance restored. The respondent will pay the appellant's costs in this Court and in the Lower Appellate Court.