1. A preliminary objection has been taken that the revision petition does not lie but following Parama-swami Aiyangar v. Alamelu Natchiar Ammal ILR (1918) M 76 and Ramaswami Goundan v. Kali Goundan ILR (1918) M 310. I hold it lies. The learned vakil for the respondents says that there is not even a suit which might go to the District Court and therefore the reason of Ayling, J. in Paramaswami Aiyangar v. Alamelu Natchiar Ammal ILR (1918) M 76. does not apply. But we have got an application under Section 111 of the Act. A suit to question it might have been filed by the defaulter under Section 112. I think this is enough to make the Revenue Divisional Officer a Court subordinate to the High Court. How far I should interfere is a difficult matter. Coming to the merits, I remember (1) that this Civil Revision Petition has been filed in April, 1925, against an order of October, 1922 ; (2) that the Board of Revenue has declined to interfere and, if possible, I should not create a conflict between an order of this Court and an order of the Board of Revenue unless there will be such a gross miscarriage of justice by my non-interference as to require my passing an order differing from the Board of Revenue. Vide Devadoss, J. in Appanna v. Latchayya ILR (1923) M 250.
2. It is true that a total stranger may not, by depositing the amount of rent, obtain a stoppage of the sale. He ought to possess an interest which will be affected by the sale. It is doubtful if that is the case here. The respondents alleged that he was a Mokhasadar of the suit land and all the proceedings taken by the petitioner against the tenants were bogus proceedings. If so, his interest cannot be affected by the sale. The only other way on which a sale may be stopped is by the payment of the amount in default by the respondent or by' some other person on' his behalf. In this case, the petitioner at first accepted the amount. We must take it that he accepted it, as if it was paid for rent due by the ryot. If so, he cannot change his mind about it and question the interest of the person paying it.
3. It is obvious on the facts of this litigation that the two parties must soon face each other in a regular suit and it is clear that it is more desirable that the matter in dispute between them should be tried in such a suit rather than be enquired in a proceeding of this kind. Having regard to this consideration and to the conditions I have already set forth at the earlier part of the judgment I decline to interfere.
4. The petition is dismissed with costs.