Satyanarayana Rao, J.
1. This is an appeal against the order of the learned District Judge of Trichinopoly, who on appeal from the order of the Subordinate Judge allowed the plaintiff's application for removal of obstruction by the appellant in this civil miscellaneous second appeal and delivery of possession.
2. The property in dispute and other properties belonged to one Haji Muhammad Ibrahim who died on 17th December 1912. After his death, there was a partition on 18th January 1916 between the two sons of Haji Muhammad, i. e., Peer Muhammad and Sulaiman and in that partition Peer Muhammad got for his share the suit property. On 23rd June 1921, Peer Muhammad settled the property now in dispute on his wife Rahiman Bibi. On 11th September 1922, Rahiman Bibi mortgaged the property to one Sikkandar, the father of the present appellant. In the year 1924, a suit for partition was filed by the two daughters of Haji Muhammad impleading the other sharers as defendants and Rahiman Bibi was impleaded as defendant 6. There was a preliminary decree in that suit on 15th August 1929 which was confirmed on appeal on 4th April 1934 and a final decree was passed on 6th January 1937. While these partition proceedings were going on, Sikkandar, the mortgagee, instituted the suit (O. S. No. 135 of 1929) on foot of his mortgage to which he impleaded as parties the original mortgagor and also the heirs of Haji Muhammad who were subsequently given up as they claimed the suit property by a title paramount. There was a decree, however, against the mortgagor and ultimately after a final decree, the property was sold and was purchased on 2nd November 1932 by the decree, holder, the mortgagee, and the property was duly delivered to him through the Court on 14th October 1933.
3. After all this, the persons to whose share the property now in dispute fell in the partition in pursuance of the final decree in O. S. No. 26 of 1925 applied in E. P. No. 414 of 1944 for delivery of possession. It may be mentioned that in the partition in pursuance of the final decree in the present suit, the property was not allotted to Rahiman Bibi but to some other sharer. When this Execution Petition No. 414 of 1944 was filed and the petitioner went to obtain delivery of possession of the property, there was obstruction by the present appellant to the delivery with the result the respondent filed an application in the Subordinate Judge's Court for removing the obstruction and for delivery of possession of the property freed from the obstruction of the appellant. The petition was filed under Section 47, Civil P. C. The present appellant who was the respondent in the counter statement filed by him raised various contentions the chief of which was that the application was not maintainable under Section 47, Civil P. C. as he was not a party to the suit O. S. No. 26 of 1925 in which a partition decree was passed. This objection was upheld by the learned Subordinate Judge and the application was dismissed. On appeal the learned District Judge reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge and allowed the petition. Hence this second appeal.
4. The only question that has to be considered in this civil miscellaneous .second appeal is whether the application of the respondent under Section 47, Civil P. C. is maintainable or not. The mortgage in favour of the appellant was long prior to the partition suit and he was not impleaded as a party to the partition suit. Rahiman Bibi alone was impleaded as defendant 6 in that suit and the purchase by the appellant in pursuance of his mortgage decree was no doubt during the pendency of the partition proceedings. It was contended on behalf of the respondent here and also in the Courts below that the purchase by the appellant is affected by the doctrine of lis pendens and that, therefore, he is not entitled to resist the application of the respondent for delivery of possession. If the mortgage in favour of Sikkandar was during the pendency of the partition suit and the court sale was also during the pendency of that suit, no doubt, the principle of the decision of the Privy Council in Parmeshri Din v. Ramcharan would apply and the appellant would not be permitted to rely upon the rights which he had acquired under the court sale. This Court has consistently taken the view that the doctrine of lis pendens should not be extended to cover an involuntary alienation in execution of a mortgage decree where the mortgage was prior to the suit relied on as operating to affect the rights of the parties under the provisions of Section 52, T. P. Act. It is needless to refer to all the cases on the point as they have been considered in Natesa Chettiar v. Subbunarayana Iyer : AIR1945Mad91 . The effect of this line of decisions, in my opinion, is really to date back the rights of the purchaser in execution of the mortgage decree to the date of the mortgage. The foundation of the decision of our Court in Chinnasami Padayachi v. Dharmalinga Padayachi, 56 Mad. 115 : A. I. R. 1932 Mad. 666 is the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Har Pershad Lal v. Dei Mardan Singh, 32 Cal 891 : 9 C.W.N. 928 the principle is stated thus:
'Much argument has been spent on the doctrine of lis pendens, the plaintiff's contention being that the defendant having purchased the property under a decree in a suit instituted subsequent to the suit by his assignor and during the pendency of the suit, are bound by its result It seems to me, however, the argument has not much force. The defendants are not purchasers in ordinary execution. They purchased under a decree for sale on their own mortgage. They took the property in the same condition as it stood at the date of the mortgage to them. Their title, therefore, dated back Syed Mantozuddeen Muhammad v. Raj Coomer Das, 23 W. R. 187 : 14 Beng. L. R. 408. So did the plaintiff's title as regards the mortgage to his assignor. The title of each relates back to the date of the mortgage under which the claim is made.'
If this is the correct principle on which the decisions of our Court are based, I find it very difficult to conclude that the auction-purchaser is really a representative of Rahiman Bibi, the original mortgagor, and that this application falls within Section 47, Civil P. C. In my opinion, the view taken by the learned 'Subordinate Judge on this question is correct though he was not justified in dismissing the application altogether. He ought to have given permission to the petitioner to convert the application into a suit and should have proceeded with the trial of the suit.
5. The result is, the appeal should be allowed, the orders of the Courts below should be set aside and the application remanded to the first Court with a liberty to the respondent in this appeal to pay the court fee payable on this application treating it as a plaint and for converting it into a plaint within one month after the date of the receipt of the records by the lower Court. The appellant is entitled to his costs throughout. No leave.