1. In our opinion, the learned Judge was right in revoking the leave to sue granted to the appellant.
The suit was filed for the following reliefs (1) a declaration that a letter executed by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant was not valid and binding on the plaintiff, (2) an injunction restraining the defendant from taking any steps, civil or criminal, against the plaintiff to enforce the claim, and (3) the payment of Rs. 3000 as damages. the letter in question was admittedly executed in Delhi. The undue Influence and coercion exercised by the defendant were at Delhi. The defendant resides at Delhi. The only way in which the appellant sought to sustain his application for leave to sue in this Court was that a part of the cause of action in any event arose in Madras because the defendant attempted to enforce the letter by taking steps to collect the money at Madras. In paragraph 12, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was attempting to collect the moneys alleged to be due under the letter through the United Commercial Bank Ltd., Madras, and that the Bank was pressing the plaintiff to pay the amount.
It was further alleged that the defendant had addressed to the plaintiff at Madras certain threatening letters relating to the collection of the amounts due under the letter. We agree with the learned Judge in holding that the fact that steps were being taken by the defendant to collect the money from the plaintiff at Madras would not mean that a part of the cause of action had arisen in Madras. Nor can the threatening letters received at Madras confer jurisdiction on this Court. As the learned Judge observes, 'The demand for payment has no relation to the reliefs prayed for in the suit.'
2. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon three decisions, which, according to him, furnish a principle which could be applied to the facts of the present case by way of analogy. We, however, think that these cases do not help him.
In -- 'Banke Beharilal v. Pokhe Ram', 25 All 48 (A), a consent decree had been passed by the High Court of Calcutta, and it was sent to the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore for execution, and there were proceedings pending before the latter Court in execution. A suit was filed in the Cawnpore Court for ft declaration that the compromise and the decree founded thereon were null and void and for an injunction restraining the defendant from executing the decree. It was held that although the decree had been passed in Calcutta, yet inasmuch as the property affected by the decree was in Cawnpore and execution was being taken out there, the material portion of the plaintiff's cause of action arose in Cawnpore, and the Subordinate Judge of Cawnpore had Jurisdiction to try the suit.
In the present case, there is no proof of any such action by the defendant. A mere attempt to collect the money due under the letter would not be analogous to execution proceedings in pursuance of a decree.
The facts in -- 'Arunachellam Chettiar v. Velappa Thambiran AIR 1915 Mad 915 (B) are similar to those in 25 All 48 (A). A decree had been obtained in Court K and it was transferred to Court T for execution. While execution was pending, the judgment-debtor sued in Court T that the decree was not binding on him. It was held that the Court T had jurisdiction.
In -- 'Hadjee Ismail Hadjee Hubbeeb v. Hadjee Mahomed Hadjee Joosub', 13 Beng LR 91 (C), the plaintiff, a resident in Calcutta, sued H, a resident in Bombay, to set aside a release executed by him in Calcutta of his interest in certain properties situated in Bombay. The plaint prayed that the release may be declared void and cancelled, and that a certain Inventory and account relating to the said property which the plaintiff had been induced to file in Bombay may be declared not binding on the plaintiff, for an account, and for appointment of a receiver. It was held that the entire cause of action did not arise in Calcutta so as to enable the plaintiff to sue in Calcutta without leave of the Court. We fall to see how this case helps the appellant. The reliefs of cancellation of the inventory and account filed in Bombay and the appointment of a receiver in respect of property which was situated in Bombay obviously were founded on a cause of action which did not arise in Calcutta.
3. We, therefore, agree with the learned Judge and dismiss the appeal. As the advocate for the respondent reported no instructions, the appeal was heard 'ex parte. No costs.