Muthusami Aiyar, J.
1. This was a suit to set aside a revenue sale held under Act II of 1864. The sale was held in June 1888 and this suit was brought on the 12th August 1889. It is found that at the date of sale there were arrears of revenue due to the Government to the extent of Rs. 51-1-7 and i is clear that the Collector had jurisdiction to, sell the land under Act II of 1864. It is found, however, by the Lower Appellate Court that the sale was not duly notified as required by the Act and to this extent the procedure followed by the Collector was irregular. Both the lower courts find that tho 7th defendant pur-chased the land benami for tho 8th and. 9th defendants of whom the former is the Adhikari of tho Amsom wherein the land brought to sale is situated. Appellants imputed fraud to the Adhikari but tho courts below have negatived it. It is further found that appellants were aware of the sale and its confirmation more than six months before suit. Tho question for decision in this appeal is whether upon the foregoing facts the courts below were correct in holding that the sale was a proceeding within the meaning of Section 59 of Act II of 1864 and that the suit was therefore barred by limitation. The contention in second appeal is that the sale though valid as between the Collector and appellants, is not so as between the latter and the purchaser on the ground of fraud. The decision of the lower courts is in accordance with the principles laid down in Nilakandan v. Thandamma I. L. R 9 M 460 and in Venkata v. Chengadu I. L. R 12 M 168 The decision in the last mentioned case is that of four judges who held that the revenue sale in that case, however irregular it was, was a proceeding under the Act for purposes of limitation as the Collector had jurisdiction to sell. It was also pointed out in that case that the decision in I. L. R 9 M 460 proceeded on the ground that there were really no arrear of revenue and that the sale was really without jurisdiction. Both decisions recognize tho general principle that a revenue sale is a statutory sale and that when there are arrears of revenue so as to give jurisdiction to the Collector to sell, the sale, however irregular, must be treated as a proceeding under the Act. I am unable to reconcile the contention of appellants' pleader with, the principle that statutory sales depend for their validity upon the pre-requisites prescribed by the statute and not on matters which lie outside its purview. I would decline to order any further enquiry whether the price realized was adequate and whether any substantial injury resulted from the sale not having been duly notified, and dismiss the second appeal on the ground that the sale in this case was a proceeding under Section 59 of Act II of 1864 and that the suit is time-barred.
2. The finding on the issue sent for trial is that the sale was not notified as required by Act II of 1864. This is a finding of fact which we must accept. It is contended, however, on behalf of respondents that the suit is time-barred by Section 59 of the Act. The mere fact of 2nd plaintiff being a minor is not sufficient to save the limitation bar when the alleged fraud came to the knowledge of others jointly interested with the minor more than six montns prior to the institution of the suit ; for, as observed in Seshan v. Rajagopala I. L. R 13 M 236 Section 8 of the Limitation Act is inapplicable, the object of that section being the 'same as that of the corresponding Section 4 of the English Act, 3 and 4 William . IV, Chapter 42, which as remarked by Lord Kenyan, C. J., in Perry v. Jackson 4 T. E 516 at p. 519, 'was introduced into the statute in order to protect the interests of those persons which there was no one of competent age, competent understanding, or competent in point of residence in, the country to protect,' see also Vigneswara v. Bapayya Second Appeal No. 335 of 1892 which is to be found reported in the Madras Law Journal Reports, Vol. III, page 216, and I. L. R 16 M 436 As was held in Venkata v. Chengadu I. L. R, 12 M 168 the period of limitation for a suit such as the present is six mouths from the date on which the fraud was discovered, and as the present suit was brought more than six months after the alleged fraud came to the knowledge of plaintiff's father and also of 1st plaintiff himself, it is clearly time barred.
3. The appeal fails therefore and is dismissed with costs.