1. The Appellate Tribunal has referred to following question under s. 27(1) of the W.T. Act :
'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the provisions of section 35 of the Wealth-tax Act could not be invoked to apply the amended provisions of section 5(1)(viii) of the Wealth-tax Act for the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 on the ground that the application of the said amended provision involved a debatable question of law ?'
2. The assessee, a lady, filed returns under the W.T. Act for the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70. Before the WTO, she claimed exemption on the value of certain jewellery, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CWT v. Mrs. Arundhati Balkrishan : 70ITR203(Guj) . The WTO relied on another decision of the Patna High Court in Pandit Lakshmikant Jha v. CWT : 69ITR545(Patna) and held that the value of the jewellery was liable to be assessed. He took Rs. 69,705 as the value of the jewellery in each of these assessment years. The assessee appealed to the AAC and the contention before him was that the WTO should not have included in the total wealth the value of the various ornaments and pieces of jewellery amounting to Rs. 69,705 since the same would be exempt from taxation under s. 5(1)(viii) of the W.T. Act as held in CWT v. Mrs. Arundhati Balkrishan : 70ITR203(Guj) . The AAC agreed with the assessee's contention and pointed out thus :
'The details of the jewellery filed before me show that they are gold and diamond bangles, gold and diamond necklaces and chains, ear and nose screw, etc. These undoubtedly are articles intended for the personal use by the appellant, the appellant being a lady. In the circumstances, I would agree with the appellant's claim that the total value of the jewellery would require to be excluded from the total wealth.'
3. On December 24, 1979, the AAC issued a notice under s. 35 of the W.T. Act proposing to restore the assessment. By the Finance (No 2) Act, 1971, an amendment was made to s. 5(1)(viii). The provision, in so far as it is material, before the amendment, ran as under :
'Subject to the provisions of sub-section (1A), wealth-tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of the following assets....
(viii) furniture, household utensils, wearing apparel, provisions and other articles intended for the personal or household use of the assessee.'
4. After the amendment, the following words, namely, 'but not including jewellery' were added at the end of the provision. A proviso was also added. The provision, as amended thereafter, runs as follows :
'(viii) furniture, household utensil, wearing apparel, provisions and other articles intended for the personal or household use of the assessee, but not including jewellery : Provided that the furniture, utensils or other articles are neither made wholly or partly of, nor contained (whether by way of embedding, covering or otherwise) gold, silver, platinum or any other precious metal or any alloy containing one or more of such precious metals :...'
5. However, while the words 'but not including jewellery' were added with retrospective effect from the April 1, 1963, the proviso was brought into operation with effect from April 1, 1972.
6. The AAC proposed to rectify his order under s. 23 of the W.T. Act as a result of the amendment which excluded jewellery from the exemption. The assessee relied before the AAC on a decision of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Special Bench, Bombay, in which the question whether there could be a rectification of an assessment, as a result of the amended provision, was considered. The said Tribunal pointed out in its order :
'In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in T. S. Balaram, ITO v. Volkart Brothers : 82ITR50(SC) , it is only the apparent errors, namely, those error which did not require to be demonstrated by an argument or discussion that would be eligible for rectification. In the present case, in view of the fact that it would be necessary to go into the list filed by the assessee and to see what are the items comprehended by jewellery as understood above, the provisions of section 35 cannot be put into operation.'
7. The said Tribunal held that even though the statute is retrospective in operation so as to cover the assessment years under consideration, still there was no rectifiable error which could be corrected under s. 35 of the Act. The AAC relied on this judgment of the Tribunal and came to the conclusion that there was no rectifiable error.
8. Against this order of the AAC refusing to rectify his earlier order dated April 30, 1970, the WTO filed appeals before the Tribunal. The Tribunal relying on two decisions, one of the Bombay High Court and the other of the Gujarat High Court to be noticed presently, came to the conclusion that the AAC rightly dropped the proposed action under s. 35 for both the years. The appeals of the department were dismissed. At the instance of the Commissioner, the question set out earlier has been referred to this court.
9. Section 35 of the W.T. Act provides the power for rectification of any order passed among others by the AAC which contains any mistake apparent from the record. The question for our consideration is whether there was any mistake apparent from the record which could have been rectified by the AAC, but which he did not do. There can be no dispute about the fact that the amended provision has retrospective effect from April 1, 1963. Therefore, jewellery stood excluded from the exemption under s. 5(1)(viii) with effect from April 1, 1963. The assessment years under consideration are subsequent to April 1, 1963, they being 1968-69 and 1969-70. Therefore, prima facie, the amended provision would apply.
10. The Supreme Court in M. K. Venkatachalam, ITO v. Bombay Dyeing and . : 34ITR143(SC) was concerned with a somewhat similar problem under the I.T. Act. The ITO assessed the tax for the assessment year 1952-53, by order dated October 9, 1952. In that order he gave credit for a sum of Rs. 50,063 being interest at 2% on tax paid in advance under s. 18A(5) of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922. Section 13 of I.T. (Amend.) Act, 1953, which was passed subsequently inserted a proviso to s. 18A(5) to the effect that an assessee was entitled to interest, not on the whole of the tax paid in advance, but only on the difference between the tax so paid and the amount of tax determined on regular assessment. This amending section was deemed to have come into force on April 1, 1952. Under s. 18A(5), as amended, the assessee would be entitled to interest only in a sum of Rs. 21,157 as against Rs. 50,063 granted earlier. The ITO exercising his power under s. 35 of the Indian I.T. Act, 1922, which corresponds to s. 35 of the W.T. Act, rectified the mistake in the order of assessment and demanded from the assessee the difference between Rs. 50,063 and Rs. 21,157 which came to Rs. 29,446.
11. The assessee took the matter under art. 226 of the Constitution and prayed for a writ of prohibition against the ITO on the ground that there was no mistake apparent from the record as the order of assessment was valid, judged in the light of the law as it stood on the date of the order. The Bombay High Court accepted the assessee's submission and issued a writ accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed this decision of the Bombay High Court and pointed out that the effect of the provision that s. 13 of the Amendment Act should be deemed to have come into force on April 1, 1952, was that the amendment to s. 18A must be deemed to have been included in the principal Act as from April 1, 1952, for all purposes and that, therefore, the proviso must be deemed to be part of s. 18A on the date of the passing of the assessment order; consequently, the assessment order was inconsistent with the proviso to s. 18A and must be deemed to suffer from a mistake apparent form the record and the ITO was, therefore, held to be justified in exercising his power under s. 35 and rectifying the mistake.
12. At page 147, the contention of the assessee has been set out in the following words :
'The argument for the respondent is that the assessee had obtained a right under the order passed by the Income-tax Officer to claim credit for the specified amount under section 18A(5) and the said right cannot be taken away by the retrospective operation of section 13 of the Amendment Act. The same argument is put in another form by contending that the finality of the order passed by the Income-tax Officer cannot be impaired by the retrospective operation of the relevant provision.'
13. This contention was disposed of by their Lordships as follows (pp. 147, 148) :
'In our opinion, this argument does not really help the respondent's case because the order passed by the Income-tax Officer under section 18A(5) cannot be said to be final in the literal sense of the word. This order was and continued to be liable to be modified under section 35 of the Act. What the Income-tax Officer had purported to do in the present case is not to revise his order in the light of the retrospective amendment made by section 13 of the Amendment Act alone, but to exercise his power under section 35 of the Act; and so the question which falls to be considered in the present appeal centres round the construction of the expression 'mistake apparent from the record' used in section 35. That is why we think the principle of the finality of the orders or the sanctity of the existing lights cannot be effectively invoked by the respondent in the present case.'
14. At page 150 it was observed by the Supreme Court :
'Prima facie it may appear somewhat strange that an order which was good and valid when it was made should be treated as patently invalid and wrong by virtue of the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. But such a result is necessarily involved in the legal fiction about the retrospective operation of the Amendment Act. If, as a result of the said fiction, we must read the subsequently inserted proviso as forming part of section 18A(5) of the principal Act as from April 1, 1952, the conclusion is inescapable that the order in question is inconsistent with the provisions of the said proviso and must be deemed to suffer from a mistake apparent from the record. That is why we think that the Income-tax Officer was justified in the present case in exercising his power under section 35 and rectifying the said mistakes.'
15. In our opinion, this decision laying down the effect of a retrospective amendment is completely in favour of the revenue. But the learned counsel for the respondent has drawn our attention to the two judgments of the Bombay and Gujarat High Courts relied on by the Tribunal and we, therefore, look into these cases to see whether any other view was possible in this case.
16. In J. M. Shah v. J. M. Bhatia, AAC : 94ITR519(Bom) , the Bombay High Court considered the applicability of s. 35 of the W.T. Act to rectification of the order in which s. 5(1)(viii) before the amendment had to be applied and whose application after the amendment would be wrong. In the W.T. assessment of the assessee 1969-70, the AAC passed an order on June 26, 1970, excluding from the assessment a sum of Rs. 4,15,942, being the value of jewellery and ornaments on the ground that they were intended for the personal use of the assessee in accordance with the existing provision of s. 5(1)(viii) of the W.T. Act, as it was then in force. After the retrospective amendment, the AAC passed an order of rectification under s. 35 on February 22, 1972, withdrawing the exemption granted to the assessee in respect of the jewellery and ornaments. The assessee filed a writ petition challenging the rectification order. The Bombay High Court held that it was a debatable point of law as to whether the amending provision applied to a completed assessment against which no further proceedings were pending at the date of enactment of the amending provision, as in the present case. As the applicability of the Amendment Act to the completed assessment was itself, according to the learned judges, a debatable point, it was held that there was no mistake apparent from the record, and that the AAC had no jurisdiction to rectify the original order dated June 26, 1970.
17. In the course of the judgment, reference was made to the decision of the Supreme Court in M. K. Venkatachalam, ITO v. Bombay Dyeing and . : 34ITR143(SC) . This decision was sought to be distinguished by the learned counsel for the assessee by taking up the following submissions (P. 527 of 94 ITR) :
'(1) the said case does not dissent from the well-settled principle that a debatable point of law cannot be the subject of rectification since ex hypothesi, the error could not possibly be called apparent;
(2) the said case is not an authority for the proposition that a deeming provision giving retrospective effect must necessarily be held to affect completed assessments;
(3) the said case is only an authority on the construction of a particular provision of the Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1953, and on a construction thereof it was held that the provision applied to assessments completed before the date on which the power was invested by the Amending Act; and
(4) in the said case there is no discussion as to why the point as to the construction of the relevant provision should not be regarded as debatable when two judges of the High Court had in the lower court taken a contrary view on construction, nor is three a discussion as to why the retrospective effect provided for in the Amending Act should extend to assessments completed before the date of the amendment.'
18. The Supreme Court considered the argument which was urged before it, namely, that the retrospective operation of the relevant provision should not be held to have been intended to affect a completed assessment in the absence of an express enactment or necessary intendment. In regard to that argument, the Supreme Court took the view at pages 147-148 in M. K. Venkatachalam's case : 34ITR143(SC) , that the original assessment order passed by the ITO could not be said to be final in the literal sense of the word, as it was and continued to be liable to be modified in rectification proceedings under s. 35 of the Act. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that the principle of the finality of the orders or the sanctity of existing rights could not be effectively invoked by the respondent in the said case.
19. At page 527 in J. M. Shaw's case : 94ITR519(Bom) , Vimadalal J., who delivered the leading judgment, observed :
'It is pertinent to note that, in the view which the Supreme Court took in the said case, viz., that the mistake in question was glaring and obvious mistake and the question which arose could not be said to be debatable or arguable, it did not have occasion to consider the further question as to whether the power of rectification could have been invoked had it come to the conclusion that it was an arguable question. The said decision of the Supreme Court does lay down that a deeming fiction couched in words similar to the words used in the present case should be construed as intending to affect even completed assessments...'
20. The above disposes of the first proposition and part of the fourth proposition put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner in that case. As far as the second proposition was concerned, the learned judge observed at page 527 and 528 :
'His second comment in regard to that case is clearly correct, in so far as the said case cannot be considered to be an authority for the proposition that full retrospective effect must be given to all such deeming provisions. As far as the third proposition is concerned, it is true that what the Supreme Court did in the said case was to construe a particular provision of a particular amending Act, but in so far as there is a great similarity in the language used in the Amending Act in the said case and in the present case in regard to the retrospective operation of the amending provision the said case does undoubtedly support Mr. Joshi's (learned counsel for the revenue) contention before us that such provisions must be held to affect even completed assessments.'
21. This case accepts that a retrospective amendment may affect a completed assessment, and does not support the Tribunal's conclusion that the rectification is wrong.
22. The learned judge, however, held (at p. 534 of 94 ITR) that in the said case the order of the AAC was not properly amended because, 'ironically enough, Mr. Joshi (learned counsel for the revenue) had to debate before us for several hours in order to convince us that the question as to whether a completed assessment was intended to be affected by the amendment in question in the present case, was not debatable at all. As observed by Hegde J., in Volkart Brothers' case : 82ITR50(SC) , a mistake apparent on the record must not be something which can be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may conceivablybe two opinions. I must, therefore, hold that the power of rectification under section 35 of the Act could not be invoked in the present case and the rectification order passed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner on the February 22, 1972, must be quashed and he should be restrained from enforcing the same.'
23. The other learned judge (S. K. Desai J.), in a separate but concurring judgment, agreed with the conclusion of Vimadalal J.
24. When the Bombay High Court has itself subscribed to the view that a completed assessment, against which no proceedings are pending, can be affected by a retrospective amendment, we do not see how the learned counsel for the revenue taking several hours to convince the court on the said question makes it a debatable issue. In fact, the Supreme Court itself in Venkatachalam's case : 34ITR143(SC) has laid down this proposition and there is no question of any debate on this proposition thereafter. The distinction between an apparent error and the construction and legal effect of a statutory provision that is to be applied must be kept in mind. When an apparent mistake is found in an order, the jurisdiction to rectify is acquired. The question whether in a given case this jurisdiction is properly exercised because a particular provision, on a proper construction, does not apply, would affect the merits of the order and not its jurisdictions If it is wrong on merits, it can be examined in an appeal or revision The Bombay High Court's judgment in so far as it does not deep in view this distinction cannot be taken as laying down the correct law.
25. The other decision relied on by the respondent is Padmavati Jaikrishna v. CWT : 105ITR115(Guj) . In that case, the assessee claimed exemption in respect of jewellery on the ground that they were articles intended for personal use falling within s. 5(1)(viii) of the W.T. Act before its amendment. The assessee filed a list along with her return where two categories of jewellery were broadly mentioned, one category dealing with ornaments studded with precious stones and the second category dealing with gold ornaments simpliciter. The WTO rejected her claim for exemption by his order dated May 19, 1962. He held that the articles should not be treated as articles intended for personal use. The assessee appealed to the AAC who, following the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Arundhati Balkrishna's case : 70ITR203(Guj) , held that she was eligible for exemption. By the time the Tribunal was called upon to decide this question, the decision of the Gujarat High Court was confirmed by the decision of the Gujarat High Court was confirmed by the decision of the Supreme Court in CWT v. Arundhati Balkrishna  77 ITR 505. The Tribunal, therefore, confirmed, the order of the AAC. After the retrospective amendment by the Finance (No 2) Act, 1971 of s. 5(1)(iii), the WTO made an application to the Tribunal praying for the rectification of the Tribunal's order in the light of the amended law. The Tribunal allowed the application for rectification and the matter was taken to the Gujarat High Court on a reference of the following question : 'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was right in holding that there was an error apparent from the record in granting exemption in respect of jewellery while disposing of the appeal on October 16, 1970 ?' At page 124(105 ITR) it was observed :
'It is no doubt true that as far as section 5(1)(viii) was concerned jewellery was excluded from the exempted list of wealth with effect from April 1, 1963. That is what has been sought to be done by section 32 of the Finance (No 2) Act of 1971, by inserting the words, 'but not including jewellery' after the words, articles intended for the personal or household use of the assessee' with effect from April 1, 1963.'
26. However, the learned judges went into the question as to what was the rational basis for providing two different dates in respect of the amendment of s. 5(1)(viii) and the adding of a proviso to the same provision. After considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Dyeing and .'s case : 34ITR143(SC) , the learned judges remarked at page 125 :
'As rightly contended by the learned Advocate-General on behalf of the assessee, this involves the question of the extent of the retrospectivity of the two amendments. This question, therefore, which is capable of serious debate on either side, cannot be said to be by any stretch of imagination to be a mistake apparent from the record of the case.'
27. At page 128, the following passage occurs :
'In the present case before us the question of extent of the retrospectivity arise from the meaning of 'jewellery' as sought to be enlarged and given in Explanation 1 which has been made effective prospectively from April 1, 1972, and it is highly debatable. Mr. Kaji, therefore, urged that at the time of passing consequential orders the Tribunal can certainly look into this aspect of the question as to the meaning of the term jewellery' and decide according to correct legal principles. We are not inclined to agree with Mr. Kaji that what the Tribunal would be required to do in this case, after its order January 3, 1972, directing the reopening and rehearing of the appeal afresh, would be merely to pass consequential orders and directions. We do not think that it can be said by any stretch of imagination that when the Tribunal will decide what articles claimed by the assessee as jewellery are jewellery or not and what articles should be included in the net wealth of the assessee for purposes of the assessment year in question or subsequent years and what articles should be brought into the net wealth in assessment years after April 1, 1972, the Tribunal would be merely making consequential orders. The learned Advocate-General was, therefore, perfectly justified when he urged that the question of extent of retrospectivity may assume importance from the incidental question of the meaning of the term 'jewellery' in debate and discussion. It may be that after scrutinising the relevant provisions of the Wealth-tax Act as amended from time to time and after hearing the arguments on both the sides, the Tribunal may accept and prefer one view or the other, but that decision of the Tribunal would be on the merits. The Tribunal is, therefore, not justified, as rightly contended by the learned Advocate-General, in exercising its rectification power on the ground that because jewellery has been excluded from the list of the exempted wealth by the amendment sought to be made by section 32(1)(ii) of the Finance (No 2) Act of 1971 with effect from April 1, 1963, the assessment completed for the assessment year 1963-64 could be disturbed and rectified. It will virtually amount to reopening and reassessing the assessee concerned.'
28. We are unable, with respect, to agree with the conclusion that there is any debatable question as to the retrospectivity of the amendment in the present case because some other provision has been enacted prospectively. There can be no question of doubt as to the retrospective character of the provision which according to the statute itself comes into operation from April 1, 1963. In present cases, as will be seen presently, there is no room for doubt or dispute about the items exempted being jewellery.
29. The other amendment made by the introduction of the proviso and the Explanation do not fall for consideration as far as the present assessment years are concerned as those provision did not apply for these years. We have to read the statute only with those provisions which retrospectively occur in the statute with reference to these years. Any provision made with reference to the subsequent year cannot have any impact on the assessment for these years.
30. In the present case, the learned counsel for the assessee contended that there was a debatable issue because what the assessee got as exemption was in respect of the wearing apparel which was exempt even under the amended law. In other words, the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee is that so long as the articles fell within the provision which was left intact, the assessee would be eligible for the exemption and the exclusion of jewellery would not affect the present case. He further argued that whether these items fell within the category of wearing apparel error or apparent mistake in the order. We are unable to agree with this view also. Right from the assessment stage, the assessee claimed exemption with reference to these items only as jewellery and relied on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CWT v. Mrs. Arundhati Balkrishna : 70ITR203(Guj) . In the Gujarat case, the claim of the assessee was based on s. 5(1)(viii) which did not contain any exclusion of jewellery. Jewellery was separately provided for as an exempted item in another clause, namely, clause (xv) of s. 5(1). The contention of the department before the Gujarat High Court was that what the assessee claimed was exemption in respect of the articles shown in the list furnished by the assessee, namely, jewellery and ornaments and, therefore, the only clause which could be applied was clause (xv) of s. 5(1). The court held at page 220 :
'If an assessee is the owner of any jewellery and such jewellery cannot be described as an article intended for the personal use of the assessee, that jewellery must fall within clause (xv); and exemption to the extent of Rs. 25,000 only will apply in the case of such jewellery. But the question is whether if there are articles of ornaments or jewellery which can be described as articles intended for the personal use of the assessee, they will or will not fall within clause (viii).'
31. In that case, the jewellery were held to be articles intended for personal use, and therefore, exempted and this decision was confirmed by the Supreme Court. Thus, the basis of the claim of the assessee, relying on the decision of the Gujarat High Court in CWT v. Mrs. Arundhati Balkrishna : 70ITR203(Guj) was that the items were only jewellery which were intended for personal use. It is this aspect which is made clear by the order of the AAC which has been extracted earlier. He pointed out that the details of the jewellery filed before him showed that they are gold and diamond bangles, gold and diamond necklaces and chains, ear and nose screws, etc. It is only on the basis that they were intended for personal use that he exempted the said items from the assessment. Therefore, the assessee has throughout proceeded on the only basis that these were jewellery which were intended for personal use. As jewellery even for personal use has been excluded from the exemption, the assessee cannot now turn round and say that they are 'wearing apparel' and, therefore, there is a debatable issue. We have to look into the record to see if there is a debatable issue. The assessee cannot at this stage create a fresh dispute, and rely on it as a debatable point outside the scope of rectification. We, therefore, see no merit in the contention of the assessee.
32. The question referred to us is, therefore, answered as follows : The provisions of s. 35 of the W.T. Act could be invoked to apply the amended provisions of s. 5(1)(viii) of the W.T. Act for the assessment years 1968-69 and 1969-70 as there was a mistake apparent from the record in the order of the AAC. The result is that the Tribunal would have to direct the AAC to amend his order or by itself amend the order of the AAC, after following the proper procedure. The Commissioner will be entitled to his costs; counsel's fee Rs. 500.