1. The facts found in this case which, I must accept, are as follows:- The appellants were tenants under the plaintiffs of the suit lands. During the tenancy they defaulted in the payment of the kist due to the superior landlord and the lands were brought to sale and purchased, some by the 6th defendant himself, and some by the 6th defendant's father-in-law Lakshmana Reddi. Both the Lower Courts have found that these sales were brought about by the fraud of the defendants and have accordingly given a decree for recovery of the lands from the defendants with arrears of rent.
2. In appeal here it is argued that this suit should have been brought in a Revenue Court inasmuch as it was necessary for the plaintiffs to set aside the revenue sale. Reliance is placed on the ruling in Ramanathan v. Ramaswami ILR (1914) M 60. That ruling, however, very clearly and carefully differentiates the case reported in Gouse Moideen Sahib v. Muthialu Chettiar : AIR1914Mad657(1) , where it was held that the right to set aside a sale conferred by Section 131 of the Estates Land Act does not take away the right of suit in the ordinary Civil Courts to set aside the sale on the ground of fraud. Here we are concerned with fraud ; consequently, in accordance with the principle laid down in Gouse Moideen Sahib v. Muthialu Chettiar : AIR1914Mad657(1) , I hold that it is not necessary to bring this suit in a Revenue Court. If the defendants (appellants) were allowed to take advantage of this sale which they brought about solely to defraud the plaintiffs of their rights, it would be giving them the advantage of their own fraud. That is a course which no Court would deliberately pursue. This objection, therefore, fails.
3. It is also argued that Lakshmana Reddi should have been made a party to this suit. The plaintiffs did not choose to make him a party and of course the decree will not be binding upon him. He is a very close relation of the defendants. He actually came to Court and produced documents on their behalf, but he did not ask to be impleaded, nor did he give evidence, nor did the defendants ask that he should be impleaded as a party. The 6th defendant merely said that the suit should be dismissed because he was not a party. I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge and the District Munsif that it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to make him a party, provided that the plaintiffs are satisfied with a decree which is judicially not binding upon him. This objection also fails.
4. In view of the concurrent findings of facts of both the Lower Courts the decree appealed against is right. The second appeal is dismissed with costs.