1. The prayer in the plaint according to its terms is for a declaration that the 3rd defendant is not the illatom son of the 1st defendant's father-in-law as well as for a declaration that the 1st defendant's deed of relinquishtnent in favour of the 3rd defendant cannot affect the plaintiff's rights as reversiouer. The 3rd defendant raised various legal objections to the maintainability of the suit for a declaration that the 3rd defendant was not the illatom son of the 1st defendant's father-in-law To overcome these objections the plaintiff contended that his suit was really only one to declare the deed of reliuquishment invalid as against his reversionary rights. This contention was upheld and the suit was allowed to go on as one relating merely to the validity of the relinquishment. We cannot therefore now regard it as one relating to the 3rd defendant's rights as an illatom son. This court decided that in a suit by a reversioner for a declaration that a deed of alienation or other instrument executed by a widow will not affect his reversionary rights abates on the death of the plaintiff and the cause of action does not survive to the next reversioner in Sakyahani Ingle Rao Sahib v. Bhavani Boyi Sahib I.L.R. (1904) M. 588.. In Muthusawmi Mudahar v. Masilamani I.L.R. (1609) M. 342 the cause of action was held to survive but that was on the ground that the plaintiff in the suit asked for a declaration on behalf of himself and other reversioners We are bound by Sakyahini Ingle Rao Sahib v. Bhavani Boyi Sahib I.L.R. (1904) M. 588 which was not overruled by Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perraza I.L.R. (1609) M. 342. The Privy Council has held in Mahamed Umar Khan v. Mahamed Niazuddin Khan (1911) 22 M.L.J. 240 that Article 118 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to suits for possession (see the Judgment of the Privy Council dated 14th December 1911 which refers to and explains Thakur Tirbhuvan Bahadur Singh v. Raja Rameswar Baksh Singh (1906) 33 I.A. 156. The rights of the present petitioners who wish to prosecute the 2nd appeal as legal representatives of the original plaintiff, to recover the property on the death of the 1st defendant will not therefore be affected by their not being admitted as plaintiff's representatives and we must reject their application to be permitted to continue the appeal. The order of the Admission Court passed on 26th October 1911 on the application is set aside..
2. The second appeal abates. We make no order as to the costs of the Civil Miscellaneous Petition. The respondents will be entitled to their costs of the second appeal out of the estate of the deceased plaintiff.