1. These are appeals against the decree of the District Court of Kistna in Original Suit No. 25 of 1889.
2. In that suit plaintiff, a minor, by his natural father as next friend, sued for a declaration that he is the adopted son of one Rajah Kamadana Sobhanadri Row, deceased, and for recovery of the property movable and immovable of his adoptive father. The adoption is alleged to have been made by the two widows, of Sobhanadri under an authority given by his Will. First defendant is the surviving widow and 2nd and 3rd defendants are her daughters. Defendants denied the genuineness of the Will of Sobhanadri and pleaded that it was concocted by his senior wife Seethamma who persuaded 1st defendant to join in the adoption and other proceedings in order to secure the continuance of the Government allowance. They also pleaded that the 109 acres 14 cents of her lands claimed in the plaint were the Stridhanam property of Seethamma who had given them by Will to 2nd defendant. They denied possession of any movable property belonging to Sobhanadri or Seethamma. They also set up an agreement entered into between the widows and the natural father of plaintiff at the time of the adoption recognizing Seethamma's right to dispose of the abovementioned Inam lands and providing that the widows should have the guardianship of the adopted boy and management of the property till he attained his majority, on which event happening, if disputes should arise between them and him, he should enjoy a moiety of the property and they the other moiety until the death of the survivor of the widows, when the adopted son should take the whole.
3. The District Judge found that the adoption was duly performed but that the 'Will put forward as that of Sobhanadri was not genuine and the adoption was therefore invalid. He held however that 1st defendant was estopped by her conduct in making the adoption and otherwise from denying the validity of the adoption. He found that the alleged Will of Seethamma was not genuine, but that the Inam lands with which it purported to deal were her Stridhanam property and being undisposed of by her went to plaintiff as her heir by virtue of the estoppel. He held that plaintiff was not bound by the agreement between his natural father and the widows. He gave a decree that plaintiff should have possession of the whole estate against 1st defendant during her lifetime, that the 109 acres 14 cents, Seethamma's Stridhanam, should pass to him absolutely and that on 1st defendant's death the estate of Sobhanadri should pass to his reversioners.
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[Their Lordships held, on the evidence, the Will of Sobhanadri and the Will of Seethamma to be genuine, and the 109 acres 14 cents the Stridhanam of Seethamma, and proceeded as follows:]
4. There remains the question raised by Appeal No. 20 of 1892 whether plaintiff is bound by the terms of the agreement Exh. I between his natural father and the widows.
5. As to this we agree with the learned District Judge that the decision of the Privy Council, Bhasba Rabidat Singh v. Indar Kunwar I. L. R 16 0 556, is an authority for holding that an agreement between a widow making an adoption under an authority derived from her husband and the natural father of the adopted son cannot prejudice or affect the rights of the son which can only arise when the parental control and authority of the natural father determine. The case of Lakshmi, v. Subramanya I. L. R 12 M 490, relied on for the appellant, was one of an agreement between the adoptive father and the natural father and is not in our opinion in conflict with the decision of the Privy Council above quoted. The Madras case rests upon the principle that the adoptive father, inasmuch as he can before adoption dispose of his property as he chooses, can at the time of adoption impose such conditions as he thinks fit upon the enjoyment of his property by the adopted son. But a widow with a power of adoption derived from her husband has no such power of disposition over the property and cannot therefore impose any conditions as to the enjoyment of the property by the adopted son. The question becomes therefore simply one of agreement between the widow and the natural father of the adopted son, and his natural father cannot bind his son by any such agreement for the reason given by the Privy Council.
6. The result of this judgment is that the decree of the lower court must be modified and there will be a decree declaring that plaintiff is the adopted son of Rajah Kamadana Sobhanadri deceased and as such entitled to possession of his property movable and immovable that he do recover from 1st defendant possession of the immovable property and of the movable property found by the District Judge to be in her possession with proportionate costs, that his suit be dismissed as to the 109 acres 14 cents of Inam lands in the possession of 2nd defendant and as to the other movable property with proportionate costs. In Appeal No. 148 of 1891 1st defendant must pay plaintiff's costs. In Appeal No. 183 of 1891 plaintiff must pay 2nd defendant's costs. Appeal No. 20 of 1892 is dismissed with costs.