1. There can be no doubt but that under the general law money payable on demand is due from the date of the loan; in other words there is a cause of action on the date of the loan.
2. This being so, we must hold that in a suit brought to enforce payment of money so lent, the money must be taken to have become due, within the meaning of Col. 3 of Article 132 of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, on the date of the loan. To hold otherwise would lead to an anomaly for which there is no justification. If it was intended that money lent on the security of immovable property though payable on demand should not be subject to the general rule as to money lent and payable on demand (Article 59), the language of the 3rd Col. of Article 132 would have been so framed as to make this clear.
3. We cannot, therefore, accept the appellant's contention that in a case like the present an actual demand is necessary in order to establish a starting point for limitation under Article 132.
4. According to the decisions of this Court Article 132, and not 147, is applicable to the present case, the instrument being admittedly one executed prior to the Transfer of Property Act. Whether it might be different if the instrument had been executed after the Transfer of Property Act came into force, we need not now decide. The appellant's suit was, therefore, barred and was rightly dismissed.
5. We dismiss this second appeal with costs.