1. It is contended for the appellant that the Judge was in error in passing a decree in respondents favour under Section 10 of the Rent Recovery Act. Our order, dated 21st November 1889, directed him to determine what patta ought to be offered and to direct the tenant to execute a muchalka in accordance therewith. The question whether a Civil Court is competent to act under that section has been since considered by a Full Bench in Ramayyar v. Vedachalla I.L.R. 14 Mad. 441. It was held by the majority of the Court that though it was not competent to a Civil Court to act under that section which conferred a special power on the Revenue Courts, yet it may declare what a proper patta is in a suit properly framed for that purpose. It is argued that there was no prayer for a declaration as part of the substantive relief, and hence that this was not a proper suit for a declaratory decree. The objection is merely formal and was not taken before; moreover the plaint contains a prayer for such other relief as the Court may think fit and a specific issue was raised in regard to it. We see no objection to varying the form of the decree so as to give a declaration as to the proper patta.
2. We are not prepared to attach weight either to the contention that the Judge misconstrued our order in saying that he found it impossible to differ from the appreciation of the evidence set out therein, and that it was needless for him to reproduce the same. This only amounts to a finding upon the facts against the appellant.
3. The inference drawn in paragraph 11 of the judgment appears to be reasonable and not upon to any legal objection. The finding is that punja may be converted into achukattu nanja, though it receives no supply from the tank in the zamindari, and we cannot accede to the contention that there is no finding in that matter. Nor do we think that the decisions in Ramayyar v. Vedachalla I.L.R. 14 Mad. 441 and Apparau v. Narasanna I.L.R. 15 Mad. 47 are applicable in this case.
4. As regards the observation made by the Judge in paragraph 13 we do not consider that it is irregular to define in a patta the terms of tenancy with reference to a possible contingency which may arise in the course of the fasli for which the patta is tendered. The suggestion that the patta should contain no allusion to achukattu nanja unless such description of land actually existed at the time the patta was tendered is not in our opinion entitled to weight.
5. Exhibit F series have been sufficiently considered by the Judge, and it does not appear that the appellant urged in the Court below that they were collusively got up, or that the pattas were never acted upon. As regards Exhibit II series we observe that the District Munsif came to the conclusion that they were not genuine, and no specific objection appears to have been taken in the lower Appellate Court.
6. This is clearly not a case of enhancement of rent by reason of additional value imparted to land by works of irrigation, and the decisions relating to lands irrigated from the Kistna channels is not in point. The question arising in this suit is whether when punja is converted into achukattu nanja the zamindar is entitled to demand wet rates according to local usage.
7. The contention that the measurements and names of fields is incorrect is not pressed.
8. We shall, therefore, vary the decree by directing that a declaration of the proper patta be substituted for the relief awarded under Section 10 of the Rent Recovery Act, and that the decree be confirmed with the modification ordered in Raman Chetii v. Sattappa Pillai Second Appeal No. 111 of 1891 (not reported) where Muttusami Ayyar and Parker JJ., having before them a similar patta in delivering judgment said : 'We shall, therefore, modify the decree and amend the patta by omitting from Clause 3 the words ' or if nanja cultivation be made on punja,' and adding at the end of the clause, the words ' if nanja cultivation be made on punja land permanently converted into nanja with or without, tank water, nanja tirva according to the rate fixed for such cultivation shall be paid.'' We make no order as to costs in the appeal.