1. We think that the matter is practically concluded by the dictum of the Privy Council in the recent case of Ghulam Jilani v. Muhammed Hassan L.R. 29 IndAp 51, that an order made on an application to file an award under Section 525 of the Civil Procedure Code ' would seem to be a decree within the meaning of that expression as denned in the Civil Procedure Code.' This is a considered dictum and is, we think, fully in accordance with the scheme and policy of the Code.
2. The decision of the Privy Council in Muhammad Nawaz Khan v. Alam Khan I.L.R. 18 C. 414 is not at variance with the above view. We think that the contrary view taken in Mana Vihrama v. Krishnan Nambudri I.L.R. 3 M. 68 is erroneous.
3. Our answer to the reference made to us is (1) that the order of the District Munsif refusing to file the award and setting it aside is a decree and (2) that an appeal lay against that decree.