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Ramisetti Raghavayya Vs. Ramisetti Venkateswarlu - Court Judgment

LegalCrystal Citation
SubjectCivil
CourtChennai
Decided On
Reported inAIR1943Mad658; (1943)2MLJ157
AppellantRamisetti Raghavayya
RespondentRamisetti Venkateswarlu
Excerpt:
- - the argument on behalf of the defendant who filed this petition is that there is a well marked distinction between the two promissory notes......the two promissory notes. so far as the promissory note of 1932 is concerned it evidences a debt provable in insolvency. when it was renewed in 1935 that debt ceased to exist and a new debt arose and that new debt having been incurred after the adjudication was not provable in insolvency. as the suit has been filed on this new debt, so the argument runs, section 78(2) does not apply because there would have been nothing at all to prevent the creditor from bringing a suit on this promissory note throughout the whole period of insolvency. it is only in respect of debts provable under the insolvency that section 28 of the act prevents the filing of such suits. as already indicated this whole argument depends upon what i consider to be-purely an artificial distinction between one.....
Judgment:

King, J.

1. This petition arises out of a suit filed by the respondent in 1942 upon a promissory note executed in 1935 and the question at issue is one of limitation. It is conceded that the promissory note of 1935 was in renewal of an earlier promissory note of 1932, and that when it was executed the promisor had been adjudicated an insolvent. This adjudication was in July, 1934, and the insolvency continued until it was annulled in September, 1941. The question at issue is whether the plaintiff can now rely upon Section 78(2) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. The argument on behalf of the defendant who filed this petition is that there is a well marked distinction between the two promissory notes. So far as the promissory note of 1932 is concerned it evidences a debt provable in insolvency. When it was renewed in 1935 that debt ceased to exist and a new debt arose and that new debt having been incurred after the adjudication was not provable in insolvency. As the suit has been filed on this new debt, so the argument runs, Section 78(2) does not apply because there would have been nothing at all to prevent the creditor from bringing a suit on this promissory note throughout the whole period of insolvency. It is only in respect of debts provable under the insolvency that Section 28 of the Act prevents the filing of such suits. As already indicated this whole argument depends upon what I consider to be-purely an artificial distinction between one promissory note and another. Suits arc commonly filed upon promissory notes, but in essence the promissory note is not itself a debt but only evidence of adebt. It seems to me impossible in this case to say that when a debt had been incurred in 1932 and merely renewed In 1935 there were two distinct debts one provable and the other not provable in insol-vency. A more liberal view must, I think be taken of the meaning of a debt. This debt, although evidenced by a document executed in 1935, had been in existence since 1932 and was therefore provable in insolvency. That being so Section 78(2) applies and the decision of the learned District Munsif that the suit was brought within time is correct. The Civil Revision Petition accordingly fails and sis dismissed with costs.


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