1. The point taken by Mr. Farthasarathy Aiyengar, on behalf of the appellant at the hearing of the appeal, is that as the District Judge has found the issue as to Illatom in favour of plaintiff, he ought to have decreed to plaintiff the moiety of the property claimed by him, notwithstanding the findings adverse to plaintiff on the other issues.
2. The Judge's finding as to Illatom is that 'if the postion of an Illatom had not been conceded to plaintiff definitely by the husband of defendant, it had been practically allowed by defendant herself.' The reason given for this finding is that the evidence and the ad-mission of the defendant as to her using plaintiff seem to make it clear that plaintiff was kept in the house after the defendant's husband's death, which took place in the year in which plaintiff married her daughter. Defendant's admission as to her usage of the plaintiff is that as she did not come out being a female', she sent for her son-in-law (who, she says, lived in her own father's house) and was paying money to the Sircar through him.'
3. Even assuming that plaintiff did live in defendant's house and assisted the defendant after her husband's death, this circumstance would not, I think, be sufficient to constitute him an Illatom. There must have been some specific agreement as to his being made an Illatom son-in-law, and plaintiff has tried to prove such agreement, but I concur with the District Judge in disblieving the witnesses who deposed thereto for the reasons given by the Judge, which need not be repeated here. The District Judge has found it not proved that plaintiff's father-in-law 'associated plaintiff with himself in the management of the property,' and it is extremely doubtful if defendant (a female) could, after her husband's death and when plaintiff had already been married to that husband's daughter (defendant's step-daughter), constitute plaintiff an Illatom son in-law. But be this as it may, I am unable to agree with the District Judge in thinking that the mire fact of plaintiff being allowed to live in his father-in-law's house (where it appears plaintiff's adoptive father Jali Reddy was also living at the time) and defendant's employing plaintiff to pay the kist after her husband's death are sufficient to constitute the plaintiff an Illatom, son-in-law. Further, from the plaint it is seen that it was not as an Illatom son-in-law that plaintiff claimed a moiety of the plaint property. Had such been the case, there was no reason why he should have confined his claim to a moiety merely instead of the whole, for even according to his own witnesses the agreement at the time of the plaintiff's marriage to defendant's husband's daughter was that in the absence of male issue of the father-in-law, plaintiff was to have the whole property. Plaintiff has, it is true, also stated in the plaint that from the time of his marriage he had Illatom rights in the defendant's family. But that was not the case on which he rested his claim. The case was an alleged union between the family of plaintiff's adoptive father Jali Reddy, and defendant's husband's father Kodandarama Reddy. It is stated in para. 1 of the plaint that Kodandarama Reddy being then a 'single man' (i.e., I presume a widower as he had a son Venkatasami to whom defendant was subsequently married) and as the defendant's husband Venkatasami was young, he was not able to manage the cultivation work, etc., he, therefore, asked the plaintiff's adoptive father and the latter's father Papireddy to come and join his family, and settled that the moveable and immoveable property of both should be united and remain joint, and that, as each had a son, they should divide the property equally in the event of division taking place at any future time.' It is then stated that the two families accordingly became united and joined their property in one common stock. This is in fact the basis on which the plaintiff brought the present suit and confined his claim1 to a moiety of the property. It is, however, seen from the evidence of some of plaintiff's own witnesses that Papireddy did not at any time live, in defendant's husband's house, and that it was only after Papireddy's death that plaintiff's adoptive father, Jali Reddy, went to live with his relation Kodandarama Reddy, and as to the alleged mixture of the properties of the two families, the fact proved by the Karnams (one examined as plaintiff's 4th witness and another as defendant's 9th witness) that the patta for Jali Reddi's land stood in his name and on his death was transferred to the name of his widow and subsequently to that of plaintiff, is inconsistent with the alleged union of the two families and mixture of their properties.
4. I agree with the lower Court in finding that there was no such union as alleged in the plaint, and I also find that plaintiff has failed to prove that he has any Illatom right in the property belonging to defendant's husband.
5. Defendant has in her written statement admitted plaintiff's right to the lands Nos. 3 and 4 of Schedule A, and defendant's witnesses Nos. 1, 2 and 4 deposed to the silver girdle and gold earring, items 54 and 58 of Schedule D, being the property of the plaintiff. He appears to be entitled to none other of the plaint property.
6. The lower Court's decree will be modified by declaring plaintiff entitled to the items mentioned in the last para, and as to the rest of the property claimed, the lower Court's decree must be affirmed and this appeal dismissed with costs.
Muthusamay Aiyar J.
7. I concur.