Venkatasubba Rao, J.
1. The question raised is one of court-fee. The plaintiff, claiming to be the reversionary heir of the last male-holder Subbarayudu, has filed this suit against Subbarayudu's widow and certain alienees who claim under alienations made by Subbarayudu. He attacked the alienations on the ground that they were nominal and further challenged the genuineness of the will alleged to have been left by the last male-holder. After the filing of the suit, the plaintiff obtained a surrender of the estate from the widow and with the leave of the Court, converted his suit into one for possession. The question is, what is the proper court-fee payable?
2. The contention that a separate court-fee need not be paid in respect of the relief of declaration, as regards the alienations, is unfounded and I must reject it. The alienations being attacked, the declaration is an essential relief and to hold that it is either superfluous or unnecessary, is wrong. The plaintiff claims through the last male-holder and the question may arise, whether the declaration is a sufficient relief and whether he is not really bound to get the alienations set aside; but that question has not been raised and I do not propose to go into it. In any case, having regard to the frame of the suit, the plaintiff is bound to value the relief of declaration separately and pay a court-fee thereupon.
3. Next, it is contended that the relief of possession being consequential upon the declaration sought for, Section 7(iv)(c) of the Court Fees Act governs the case and that the plaintiff's valuation must be accepted by the court. The contention is wrong and must be rejected. The maxim generalia specialibus non derogant applies. General words do not derogate from special; conversely, a special law derogates from a general law. There being a special provision relating to suits for possession, the general provision contained in Section 7 (iv)(c) is excluded Venkatasiva Rao v. Salyanarayanamurthy I.L.R. (1932) 56 Mad. 212 : 63 M.L.J. 764 A very accurate statement of the law is contained in the following passage in the judgment of Boddam and Bashyam Aiyangar, JJ:
If the relief prayed for consequential upon the declaration be the recovery of any of the matters, mentioned in paragraphs I, II, III, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X and XI of Section 7, the mode of valuing the relief is regulated by the legislature itself in those paragraphs and in such cases the plaintiff must value the relief sought accordingly.
4. Chinnammal v. Madarsa Rowther I.L.R. (1903) 27 Mad. 480 : 14 M.L.J. 343. The same view has been taken in the Full Bench judgment in Arunachalam Chetty v. Rangaswami Pillai I.L.R. (1914) Mad. 480 : 14 M.L.J. 343 and also in Rajagopala v. Vijayara-ghavalu I.L.R. (1914) Mad. 1184. The plaintiff's Counsel next relies upon a passage in my judgment in Ramalinga v. Ramasami : AIR1929Mad529 , in support of his contention; but the point under discussion was neither raised nor considered in that case. The question raised there was one of jurisdiction and not of court-fee, and it was not argued that if the relief for possession had been separately valued, the proper valuation would have been more than Rs. 20,000. I must therefore hold that the prayer for possession should be separately valued under Section 7(v).
5. Lastly, it is contended that the plaintiff is entitled to get a refund of the court-fee paid upon the relief relating to the declaration in regard to the will. There is no force in this contention. As the plaint originally stood, the plaintiff rightly considered the relief relating to the will as essential; the fact that by his having altered the suit and claimed a higher relief, the prayer relating to the will has since became unnecessary, >can make no difference whatsoever.
6. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed with costs.