Abdur Rahman, J.
1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought on the basis of a promissory note executed by one R. Appala Naidu in favour of the plaintiff on the 8th August, 1930 (Ex. A) for Rs. 680-2-9. Several defences were raised to this suit. But the main defence, with which we are now concerned, is that of limitation. The lower Court held the suit to be barred by time and dismissed it. The plaintiff appeals.
2. Since the suit was instituted more than three years after the execution of the promissory note it would ordinarily be barred by limitation. But it is contended on behalf of the plaintiff that a payment of Rs. 145 which was made on the 23rd July, 1933, on behalf of the executant of the promissory note by his father brings the suit within time. As there is an endorsement of payment of Rs. 145 on the back of the promissory note signed by the defendant's father on the 23rd July, 1933, it has to be conceded that this payment was made by him in respect of the promissory note in suit. But the real question to decide is if the father was, as required by Section 20 of the Limitation Act, duly authorised on behalf of his son to pay this amount. So far as the endorsement is concerned, there is nothing in it which would show that the father was authorised to pay the money on behalf of his son. There is a reference in it to his (i.e., the father's) being a member of an undivided family with his son; but this is a different matter and we shall advert to it later. The father was not examined by the plaintiff although we are conscious of the reasons why the appellant did not summon him to give evidence. That does not, however, solve the plaintiff's difficulty. The onus of establishing that the payment by the father was made under the authority of the son has to be discharged by the plaintiff and unless we find it to have been discharged, he must fail. There is a reference in the statement of P.W. 2 that the plaintiff's brother was sent by the plaintiff to make a demand and the defendant when approached said in reply that he would send the money through his father. The plaintiff failed to produce his brother and the defendant's statement remained unproved. We have thus been left to depend on the oral testimony of the plaintiff and that of P.W. 2. Having regard to the fact that there is nothing in the endorsement which corroborates the statements of these witnesses, we are not inclined to place any credit, like the lower Court on their testimony.
3. The next question is, if there is anything in the endorsement itself which would show that the father was authorised to pay the money on behalf of his son. Mr. Rama Rao naturally laid a great deal of emphasis on the word 'undivided' appearing in the endorsement. His contention was that since the father and the son were members of a joint family, the father must be presumed to have been authorised on behalf of the son to make the payment. We are afraid it would be impossible for us to do so, unless there was something else to show that authority was, in fact, given to the rather by the son to pay the debt on his behalf. A member of the joint Hindu family cannot, simply because he is a member of that family, without specific authority, pay a debt on behalf of another member of the family or make an endorsement on behalf of the other member so as to enlarge the period of limitation. In the absence of any other facts from which an authority may be inferred our decision must be that the plaintiff has failed to establish that the suit was within time. The dismissal of the suit by the lower Court was thus correct and its decision must be upheld. The appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed with, costs.