1. With regard to the re-union of the brothers Lakshimpati and Sitaramayya, alleged by the defendants, we think that Exhibits VIII, IX and IV amply support the conclusion of the Subordinate Judge, and prove the re-union. But the Vakil for the appellant contends that even if there was such re-union the death of one of the re-united brothers would have a special consequence under the Hindu Law, different from the consequence, which follows on the death a co-parcener of an ordinary Hindu family that has never, been divided. He contends that the son of the. brother who had re-united would be entitled to the share which his father could have obtained if he had divided from the family immediately before his death; and that he would not have the status of a re-united member with his uncle. We do not think that this contention can be supported by any text of the Hindu Law, or by any reported case, and it seems to us to be opposed to the fundamental conception of the status of an undivided Hindu family or of a re-united Hindu family. If re-united brothers are to be regarded, not as co-parceners with right of survivorship inter se but as tenants-in-common, it is difficult to see on what principle a widow of a re-united brother could be refused her husband's share of the common property, but the appellant's Vakil admits that she could not maintain such claim against the surviving brother.
2. The decision in the case reported in Abhaicharan Janav v. Mungal Janav 19 C. 634 in which the facts are on all fours with those of the present case, is directly opposed to the appellant's contention. Following that decision, we disallow the appellant's contention and we dismiss the appeal with costs.