1. This appeal arises out of an application filed on 21st August, 1935, to execute a decree passed on 9th November, 1929, and the question is whether it is barred by limitation. Prima facie it is so barred, but the appellant claims that by reason of certain proceedings taken by the respondent he is entitled to count time as beginning to run at a much later date. f In November, 1931, respondent applied to the executing Court to record satisfaction of the decree. The Court dismissed his application. He appealed. His appeal was dismissed on 20th March, 1933. Appellant contends that under Article 182(2) of the Limitation Act time began to run only from that date.
2. The point for determination is whether the appeal by the respondent is an appeal within the meaning of that article. 1 have been referred by appellant's learned Advocate to a judgment of a Bench of which I was myself a member, reported in Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara : AIR1939Mad157 and have been asked to extend the principles of that judgment to the facts of this case. To some degree that is a very plausible argument. In the judgment prominence is given to the rule formulated by the Privy Council in Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De (1932) 63 M.L.J. 329 : L.R. 59 IndAp 283 : I.L.R. 60 Cal. 1
So long as there is any question sub judice between any of the parties, those affected shall not be compelled to pursue the so often thorny path of execution, which, if the final result is against them, may lead to no advantage.
3. That rule certainly applies to the facts in this case; for, if respondent's appeal had been allowed appellant would have had no right to execute his decree. And, from a practical point of view, there is no difference, between a decree-holder whose decree may be set aside, and a decree-holder who may be told by the Court that his decree has already been satisfied. But I cannot think that the rule so formulated by the Privy Council is intended to be the sole guide for the interpretation of the article. On p. 255 of Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara : AIR1939Mad157 , the meaning of the word 'appeal' is discussed; and it is held that an appeal in this context means any appeal which 'affects' the decree sought to be executed. It cannot be successfully argued that respondent's appeal in the present case 'affects' the decree in any way. However it may have been decided the decree remains valid and without modification. There is here in the word of their Lordships of, the Privy Council in Nagendranath De v. Sureshchandra De (1932) 63 M.L.J. 329 : L.R. 59 IndAp 283 : I.L.R. 60 Cal. 1 , no application 'to set aside or revise the decision of a Subordinate Court' which is embodied in the decree; and on page 7 of the same judgment their Lordships emphasise the principle that in construing the provisions of the Limitation Act 'equitable considerations are out of place, and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide.' To accept the contention of the appellant's learned advocate that 'appeal' in Article 182 means any appeal the result of which may affect not the decree itself, but only the decree-holder's right to execute it at a particular time and in particular circumstances is to apply just one of those equitable considerations against which the warning of the Privy Council is directed.
4. I am accordingly of opinion that the present case does not fall within the principles of Sriramachandra v. Venkateswara : AIR1939Mad157 and that if I am bound by that decision I am bound by if to dismiss and not to allow this appeal. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
5. Leave granted.