Pandrang Row, J.
1. The appellants are the decree-holders in O.S. No. 12 of 1934 on the file of the District Court, East Godavari. That was a suit instituted under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Act XIV of 1920. After removing the judgment-debtor from his office of trustee, the Court directed him to pay a certain amount with interest and also directed that all his property both movable and immovable should be charged for the amount due. In execution of that decree the appellants want to enforce the charge given by the decree in respect of some money lying in Court to the credit of the judgment-debtor in another suit. The claim is opposed by some rival decree-holders who, it appears, were instrumental in getting this money into Court in execution of the decrees obtained by them. The main ground of objection has been that the charge was not enforceable in execution because the property charged was not specific. It is on this ground that the lower Court, although it held that so far as the claim to recover the amount from the judgment-debtor was concerned the decree was executable, decided that the decree was inexecutable so far as the charge was concerned because the property on which the charge was fixed was not specific. The decision of the lower Court on this particular point cannot in our opinion be sustained for the simple reason that the words used in the decree 'all the property of the judgment-debtor both movable and immovable' are in our opinion sufficiently specific in the sense that the property charged by the decree could be ascertained at any moment. There was nothing ambiguous or uncertain in the words used, though the words were general and wide. Some decisions have been brought to our notice by the advocate for the respondent but none of them except perhaps Bheri Dorayya v. Maddipatu Ramayya I.L.R.(1881) Mad. 35 says anything in his favour. The decision in Bheri Dorayya v. Maddipatu Ramayya I.L.R.(1881) Mad. 35 itself does not in terms say that the words 'all my property' are not specific enough. What it decides is that the words found in the bond and in the decree which the learned Judges had to deal with and to which the case related were indefinite and could not create a charge because the properties were not specific. The correctness of that decision has been doubted subsequently. Vide in particular Manickam Pillai v. Audinarayana Pillai : (1910)20MLJ407 . The authority quoted in support of the view arrived at in Bheri Dorayya v. Maddipatu Ramayya I.L.R.(1881) Mad. 35 namely Deo jit v. Pitambar I.L.R.(1876) All. 275 throws some light on the considerations to be borne in mind in a case of this kind. In Deojit v. Pitambar I.L.R.(1876) All. 275 stress is laid on Section 29 of the Contract Act according to which an agreement is void if its meaning is not certain or capable of being made certain and on Section 93 of the Evidence Act to the effect that where the language of a deed is on its face ambiguous or defective, no evidence can be given to make it certain. Applying the principles embodied in these provisions of law, we have no doubt that the words found in the decree with which. we are concerned, are neither ambiguous nor uncertain. There is no reason why description of property by survey number, extent, boundaries, etc., should be insisted upon on pain of the charge being held to be void for uncertainty. It cannot be contended that if a man creates a charge on his own house and all that it contains, it would be void for uncertainty or that any charge created on a person's property in a particular village would be void for uncertainty. Again, if a man says that his properties in all the villages should be charged with any particular liability, there is no reason why the charge should be declared to be void for uncertainty. Indeed we are not able to find any good reason for regarding cases of this kind as being open to the objection of uncertainty or indefiniteness. As pointed out in Manickam Pillai v. Audinarayana Pillai : (1910)20MLJ407 , there is a good deal of difference between wideness of language and vagueness or indefiniteness of language. We are of opinion that in this case there is no real force in the objection that the charge created by the decree is void for uncertainty or that the property to which the charge relates is not specific. That being the case, it follows that the charge given by the decree was executable and the petition ought not to have been dismissed by the Court below on the ground that the charge was not executable. No other objection appears to have been pressed in the Court below to the prayer of the appellants being granted. The appeal is therefore allowed with costs in both the Courts.